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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Robert D. Radcliffe, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Sia Akhavan, an individual; 
Joel M. Lasalle, an individual; 
General Display Corporation, 
a Utah corporation; and Does 1 
through 10, inclusive, 





Robert D. Radcliffe; Republic 
International Corporation; 
Roland Kaufmann; and Does 1 
through 10, inclusive, 
Counterclaim Defendants 
and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROLAND KAUFMANN 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final default order and judgment of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt lake County, State of Utah. 
The judgment was entered on July 16, 1992. The Notice of Appeal 
was filed on August 17, 1992. The jurisdiction of the Utah Court 
of Appeals rests upon Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j)(1991). 
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Case No. 920883-CA 
Priority No. 15 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a foreign, nonresident counterclaim defendant 
was unreasonably denied the right to an evidentiary hearing to 
contest the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over him 
and/or defend on the merits by the denial of his motion for 
continuance of trial date following notice of withdrawal and 
subsequent nonappearance of his out-of-state trial counsel. 
The standard of review on this issue is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion under the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 
1377 (Utah 1988). 
2. Whether a foreign, nonresident counterclaim defendant 
was unreasonably denied the right to an evidentiary hearing to 
contest the assertion of specific personal jurisdiction over him 
and/or defend on the merits by the entry of default judgment 
against him following notice of withdrawal and subsequent 
nonappearance of his out-of-state trial counsel. 
The standard of review on this issue is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion under the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1977). 
3. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support 
a finding that a foreign, nonresident counterclaim defendant 
voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction over him by 
stipulation in this case. 
2 
The standard ^f review ^ t*hi.*= issue Is whether the lower 
court's findinqs v-tre clear Iv erroneoui:
 e Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co. 
IlltU- ! " " 
4. Wr.t'Uhe.: . . L,L C G / U - I ^ O d I^-W^-.., suffered by the seller as 
a result of honoring a covenant not to compete in a contract for 
aciditiu'.. *
 c n awaid c: cuk-jeiisaccry damages 1^1 _o „^,- /cut c: 
the sales price, 
T h e 1 o A • : • • • : c o i :i::: : I::" s « :: c i I :  ' 1 u s i o n : f 3 : ' T : • i i t h :i s :i s s I i e :i s :i : e ^  r j e w e d 
under a correction of error standard. Bailey v. Call, 767 P. 2d 138 
(Utah A p p . ) / c ert . denied, 7 73 P.2d 45 (U tah 1989). 
DETERMINAT1V fcl I''I IU \ <"' X S 1 ON.*» i,« ,li d'VW 
Although this appeal challenges several rulings of the lower 
court pursuant to Utah R. Civ 40(': respectively in 
the -.::{:x\ _ ^e coi_ \, c:..- - --" sonal 
ju r i sd ic t ion ovei . foreign, nonresident defendant, ; n ,cf-s not 
turn on che piopei j_uLer::~etatioii of zhec - : -ov:^- :n? r e - <-e. They 
are7 therefore, r^nroduc. in thft Append „: .\ ^—-:.,. uly. 
CONSTIIUT~*ONV jrxvGVISIONS 
1. U.S. Const, amend, . i • Lddendi i -
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann . § 7 8- 2 7 - 2 4 (19 8 7) -
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RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
1. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 16(d) Addendum C 
2. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 37(b)(2)(C) Addendum D 
3. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 40(b), (c) Addendum E 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was commenced by the plaintiff, Robert Radcliffe, as 
an action for damages based upon fraudulent misrepresentations 
allegedly made by the defendant and appellee, Sia Akhavan, and 
others in connection with an agreement for the purchase and sale of 
Akhavan's equity interest in General Display Corporation in 
October, 1989. (R. 2-10). Radcliffe alternatively prayed for 
rescission of the agreement and restitution of his initial payment 
thereunder. (R. 9-10). 
Akhavan responded by filing an answer and counterclaim against 
Radcliffe, Republic International Corporation, Roland Kaufmann, a 
Swiss investment banker and the appellant herein, and several 
unnamed others alleging, inter alia/ breach of contract (Radcliffe 
only), fraud and violations of state securities laws (Radcliffe, 
Republic, and Kaufmann). (R. 18-27). The assertion of specific 
personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann was based upon the disputed 
allegations that he: (1) maintained a residence in Salt Lake 
County; and (2) caused an injury within the State of Utah. (R. 19). 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
-h:^ j u r i s t : Lc:. i o n a j i s s u e //^s c o n t e s t e d by --.he p a r t i e s i n a 
' the on itset of 
-..*-• ± i t j _ c a t i o r : , . _;.e c c / j : , i e . c l a i : . t . I7-, iowi i . r - ..onevidentiary 
h e a r i n g Kaufmann': :• * - - - i l s m i s r : \ cour t ; r ; . ez t h a t 
Akhavan " . . - . . 
record alone. . CC<f-:7j. Kaufmann the;. :;.-.•?. a;. c;.cv/e: duly 
preserving - - - v^i sdiction^] ^ — ections <r - an aifirrrative defense, 
ai id t , . . . . . 
On June 3 7, ] 9.92, Kaufmann' s out-of-state lawyer filed a 
notice and motion for leave to withdraw as counsel indicating that 
he did not j ntend to appear at the trial on Jul ] , 7 ] 9:92 (E 95:9 
6 5 ) , Kaufmann then retained new counsel who immediately moved for 
a continuance of trial date I n order to obtain adequate time to 
prepare the defense, (R, 9 79). E ollowing a brief hearing on J illy 
6, 19 92, the court denied the motion and ordered the trial to 
pi oceed 1: .he i:o] ] o\ n ng day. (E ] 04 i ) • 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
At this point in the proceedings, the other parties had 
s e 11 ] e d t h e i r d i f' f e r e n c e s ,1 e a ^  r i n q c n ] y t h e c o u n t e r c 1 a i m against 
Kauf mann f or tr ia ] (R, 9 9 2; 10 2 4; 10 3 9 , • 1 0 5 ; ) Th e tr ia 1 was 
held as scheduled or: "....; :*92. Neither Kaufmann nor his trial 
counsel appeared - .*•> % fvidonrr* v n ^  introduced by Akhavan 
and a default judgment. .::*. amount ol "/jbti/ 'U.1-, was entered 
against Kaufmann including an award of both compensatory and 
5 
consequential damages. (R. 1050). He then filed this appeal. (R. 
1066). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
INTRODUCTION 
This case arises from a series of meetings and negotiations 
among various individuals and corporate entities during the latter 
half of 1989, which culminated in an agreement to purchase Sia 
Akhavan's equity interest in General Display Corporation. 
Litigation commenced when the proposed financing arrangements 
supporting the agreement failed to materialize. The material 
issues of fact turn on the precise intentions, contacts, 
representations, and roles of the various individuals and entities 
involved. Since these disputed issues are the same ones which 
create a legal basis for the assertion of specific personal 
jurisdiction over the counterclaim defendant and appellant, Roland 
Kaufmann, and since they constitute the basis of his defenses on 
the merits, a brief recitation of those facts will be presented 
here. 
PARTIES 
1. Sia Akhavan, is an individual resident of Salt Lake 
County. (R. 264). From June 21, 1988, to October, 1989, he was a 
shareholder, officer, and director of General Display Corporation. 
(R. 264). 
2. General Display Corporation (hereinafter "General 
Display") is a Utah corporation engaged in the business of 
6 
desiring, fabricating, and .; . -
commercial client 
3. Juei M. ' .r • ' "• r.dividual, was president of General 
Display during th>, uiiu. ^ei„:.ds involved herein. (R. 113). 
(Neither LaSalle nor General Display are parties to this appeal.) 
4. r - '- - - -""-/•--- ' ;- " 'r:e is a resident of Salt Lake 
County and presic-r/: ci r-p^ r*-.^ . International Corporation. (R. 3; 
19). 
5 . R e p u b J i • : I n t e i: n a t i o i I a 1 C :: • i: p o r a t i c • n (h e i e :i n - - •"; 
"Republic": _-- .. -, ;• corporation which a.cir:tal;:s offices in Salt 
Lake Co^nt-. *•- ..,_,. ^Neither Radcliffe nor Republic is a party 
6. Roland Kaufmann, 5 s a Swiss investment banker and 
resident of Zurich, Switzerland, (R 5 2 5 — 2 7 ) . Although lie once 
'•:-.-:..._ :.. o :. s a n o f f i c e r a n d d i r e c t o r o f I' e p u b i i c , 11 r* 1 \ a 6 
resigned from the company prior I: : the events alleged in the 
counterclaim, (R, ] 94; 52 6). 
7. Emanuel 1
 s„ Floor, an . , . ...-
Robert Radcliffe, was involved as a participant ;.r. t:he negotiations 
at issue herein, (R 19 5 - 96). 
8. Electra -Graphics Int. enuj (. mini .1,, I in ulln e„i iia 1" te J EGi i i 
a Utah corporation of which Emanuel Floor is president, (R. 2 6 6 ) , 
EGI contr^c1--3^ *• - nrrhp^*: o^r^-ln ^sse4"- of General Displav 
* _ -
c o u n t e r c l a i m . ;F; 102-C<\ N e i t h e r F l o o r r1 . - ~ .? a pari . ; 
"CUJ-S arr .e: 
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TRANSACTIONAL FACTS 
In June or July of 1989, Radcliffe and Emanuel Floor, acting 
either individually or on behalf of Republic, entered into 
negotiations with Akhavan, Joel LaSalle, and General Display for 
the purchase of certain computer programs, graphic displays, and 
other assets owned by the company. (R. 266). These negotiations 
resulted in a Letter Agreement executed by General Display, 
Akhavan, LaSalle, and Elektra-Graphics International, on July 27, 
1989. (R. 266; 203). Elektra-Graphics was a Utah corporation 
organized as a vehicle for the purchase and development of the 
business. (R. 266). Under this proposal, Republic was to finance 
certain aspects of the transaction under a side agreement with EGI. 
(R. 266; 207). (Radcliffe denied Akhavan's claim that Republic was 
also to become a shareholder and control the company.) (R. 266; 
195). Although Republic did provide funding of $100,000, the 
transaction was ultimately abandoned. (R. 267). Although Akhavan 
claimed in an affidavit that the transaction was cancelled at 
Kaufmann's request, (R. 267), this contention was denied by both 
Kaufmann and Radcliffe. (R. 527; 778). 
The facts surrounding Kaufmann's involvement in the next round 
of negotiations are also in dispute as illustrated by the 
conflicting affidavits themselves. 
AKHAVAN: 
"13. On or about August 12, 1989, LaSalle and I attended a 
meeting with Kaufmann, Radcliffe and Floor. Kaufmann proposed that 
he purchase a fifty percent (50%) interest in General Display on 
8 
behalf of Republic or another one of his corporations. Kaufmann 
offered $2.8 million for fifty percent (50%) of General Display and 
indicated that he would subsequently do a public offering to 
generate between $2 million and $3 million." (R. 267). 
RADCLIFFE: 
M9. Paragraph 13 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit is untrue. I was 
present at the meeting held on August 12, 1989 by and between 
KAUFMANN, RADCLIFFE, Emanuel A. Floor (hereinafter "FLOOR"), 
LASALLE and AKHAVAN. KAUFMANN made no offer concerning a 50% 
interest in General Display Corporation (hereinafter "GENERAL 
DISPLAY") for $2.8 million or any other amount. No one else at the 
meeting made such a ludicrous offer. Further, KAUFMANN did not 
indicate that he would subsequently do a public offering. He did 
indicate that, as an investment banker, he would introduce GENERAL 
DISPLAY to various underwriters in New York City who, he felt, 
would be interested in conducting a public offering for GENERAL 
DISPLAY." (R. 195-96). 
AKHAVAN: 
"14. On or about August 17, 1989, Kaufmann invited LaSalle and 
myself to a meeting with F. N. Wolfe & Company, a New York based 
securities underwriter. A merger between General Display and a 
California public company, Bristol Research ("Bristol") was 
discussed. General Display then presented a letter of interest 
indicating that the company desired to enter into a Merger 
Agreement with Bristol, obtain bridge financing in the amount of 
$500,000.00 and commit to an underwriting which would result in $5 
9 
million to $6 million being raised for the merged Bristol/General 
Display Corporation." (R. 267). 
RADCLIFFE: 
"10. In paragraph 14 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit, AKHAVAN fails 
to attach the letter he wrote to Bristol Research Corporation 
(hereinafter "BRISTOL") from GENERAL DISPLAY. A true and correct 
copy of that letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Further, 
AKHAVAN fails to attach the letter from F. N. Wolfe & Co. Inc. to 
BRISTOL which he signed. A true and correct copy of that letter is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". KAUFMANN, RADCLIFFE, FLOOR, and 
REPUBLIC are not parties to these documents." (R. 196). 
AKHAVAN; 
"15. Under the provisions of the agreement to merge with 
Bristol, I was to serve as Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer of the merged company. On or about August 28, 
1989 I visited Bristol's manufacturing plant in Costa Mesa, 
California and met with the Board of Directors of Bristol." (R. 
268) . 
"16. Around this time, Floor, Kaufmann and Radcliffe began 
representing to other parties that Floor was the Chairman of the 
Board of General Display. In fact, this was not true and was not 
consistent with the previous negotiations. For this and other 
reasons, I was unwilling to commit my interest in General Display 
to the merger. However, in an effort to accommodate the parties I 
agreed to sell my interest thereby allowing General Display to 
continue with the merger." (R. 2 68). 
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RADCLIFFE: 
"11. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit are untrue. 
I was present at the board of directors meeting of BRISTOL. FLOOR 
was introduced as chairman of the board of GENERAL DISPLAY and 
neither AKHAVAN nor LASALLE made any objection. Further, at the 
meeting, an election was held and FLOOR was elected as chairman of 
the board of BRISTOL so that the merger could be concluded 
efficiently." (R. 196). 
"12. On or about September 23, 1989, Kelly J. Flint, attorney 
for GENERAL DISPLAY wrote a letter to F.N. Wolfe and Company that 
GENERAL DISPLAY was interested in concluding the merger with 
BRISTOL. Therefore, AKHAVAN1s statement in paragraph 16 of his 
Affidavit that he was unwilling to commit his interest in GENERAL 
DISPLAY to the merger is patently false, at least until after 
September 23, 1989." (R. 196-97). 
AKHAVAN: 
"17. Throughout this time I assumed that Kaufmann, acting 
through Republic, Radcliffe and/or Floor, would purchase my 
interest in General Display. It is my understanding that Radcliffe 
and Floor are merely fronts for Roland Kaufmann. In fact, Kaufmann 
represented to me on more than one occasion that he was "the money 
man" and Radcliffe and Floor were fronts for him. Kaufmann also 
represented that he "owned" Republic along with two other public 
companies. Radcliffe also stated that Kaufmann "owned" Republic 
and "called the shots" with respect to the Company. Radcliffe told 
me that after the closing of the Agreement to purchase my stock, 
11 
Kaufmann would nominate which company would hold the General 
Display interests." (R. 268). 
RADCLIFFE: 
"13. Paragraph 17 of AKHAVAN!S Affidavit is false. I 
commenced negotiation to purchase AKHAVAN!S stock on or about 
October 1, 1989 as an individual and not as an officer of REPUBLIC. 
I conducted and concluded those negotiations as an individual and 
not on behalf of anyone else. As stated in my deposition, there 
were discussions that I may assign my interest to a third party; 
however, none of those potential assignments were consummated. I 
never made any representation to anyone that KAUFMANN "owned" 
REPUBLIC. REPUBLIC is a publicly-traded company and the stock 
ownership is clearly reflected in public documents on file." (R. 
197). 
"5g. Roland Kaufmann has never stated to anyone in my presence 
that he "owns" Republic. If he had ever done so, I would have 
corrected him at that moment." (R. 776). 
AKHAVAN: 
"18. Thereafter, I entered into negotiations with Kaufmann, 
Radcliffe, and Floor who I believed were acting individually and on 
behalf of Republic, for the purchase of my interest in General 
Display. On or about October 20, 1989, an agreement entitled 
"Memorandum of Oral Agreement by and between Robert D. Radcliffe 
and Sia Akhavan Re: General Display Corporation" was executed 
memorializing the sale of my interest in General Display. A true 
and correct copy of this Memorandum of Oral Agreement is attached 
12 
hereto as Exhibit ME". Kaufmann was instrumental in negotiating 
the terms and conditions of the October 20, 1989 Agreement." (R. 
269). 
RADCLIFFE: 
"14. Paragraph 18 of the AKHAVAN Affidavit is false. I 
personally had negotiations with Mr. Michael Katz, of the law 
offices of Burbidge & Mitchell, who acted on behalf of AKHAVAN. 
These negotiations commenced on or about October 1, 1989 and 
culminated in the October 19 Memorandum attached to the AKHAVAN 
Affidavit as Exhibit "E". To my knowledge, KAUFMANN had no 
negotiations whatsoever with Mr. Katz or AKHAVAN. At no time did 
Mr. Katz or AKHAVAN suggest that KAUFMANN, FLOOR or REPUBLIC be 
included as parties to my purchase agreement. It is clear from the 
agreement that my own personal stock in REPUBLIC was contemplated 
to be used to collateralize the agreement." (R. 197-98). 
In the hearing on July 7, 1992, and in the absence of 
Radcliffe, Kaufmann, or Kaufmann's attorney, Akhavan presented 
unchallenged testimony regarding the facts and circumstances 
supporting his theory of liability. (Tr. 3-10). The main points 
of that testimony may be summarized as follows: 
1. Akhavan learned from Joel LaSalle that "Kaufmann" was 
interested in buying his interest in General Display in September, 
1989. (Tr. 3-4; Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 1044). 
2. Akhavan met with Radcliffe and Floor whom he understood 
were acting as Kaufmannfs agents in early October, 1989, to discuss 
the terms of the deal. (Tr. 4; Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 1044). 
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3. At that meeting, a purchase price for Akhavanfs equity 
interest was agreed upon, but the terms of payment were not. (Tr. 
4; 6-7; Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 1044). 
4. Akhavan subsequently met later that month with Kaufmann 
himself "at his offices in Fort Union Boulevard" and negotiated the 
remaining terms of the deal. (Tr. 5; Findings of Fact Nos. 8, 9, 
R. 1044-45). 
5. At this meeting, Radcliffe was directed by Kaufmann to 
draft the purchase agreement on his behalf. (Tr. 5-6). 
6. The agreement dated October 19, 1989, which was signed by 
Radcliffe (individually) and Akhavan contains the terms of the 
agreement with "Kaufmann." (Tr. 5; Finding of Fact No. 9, R. 1044-
45). The agreement itself is attached hereto as Addendum F. 
At the hearing on July 7, 1992, Akhavan also presented 
unchallenged testimony regarding damages. That testimony was 
summarized in the court1s Finding of Fact No. 9 as follows: 
"(a) Purchase price of $300,000.00, payable $50,000.00 
immediately with the balance of $250,000.00 to be paid 
over 18 months at an interest rate of 10%; 
(b) Akhavan agreed not to work or compete in the commercial 
signage industry. This covenant not to compete was for 
a period of two years; 
(c) Kaufmann and Akhavan agreed that Akhavan would receive 
25% of the net proceeds from any judgment or settlement 
of the lawsuit entitled General Display Corporation v. 
The Walt Disney Company; and 
14 
(d) If any lawsuit arose from their agreements, the 
prevailing party would be entitled to attorney's fees." 
Although Akhavan was paid $50,000 initially, he was not paid 
the other amounts owed under the contract. (Tr. 7-8; Finding of 
Fact No. 12, R. 1046). 
Although not challenged at the hearing, much of Akhavanfs 
testimony was controverted by affidavits previously filed. 
RADCLIFFE: 
"6. KAUFMANN has no designated office at REPUBLIC. As an 
investment banker, it is customary for him to make periodic 
inspection trips to companies in which he has caused the placement 
of funds. As a courtesy, REPUBLIC has made a private office 
available to him, which we do for any visitors. Paragraph 8 of 
AKHAVAN's Affidavit therefore raischaracterizes RADCLIFFE's 
deposition testimony." (R. 195). 
M6a. On or about October 20, 1989, Sia Akhavan entered into a 
written Memorandum of Oral Agreement to sell his 50% interest in 
General Display to me. A down payment of $50,000 was made, 
however, the share certificate, later issued, was never transferred 
or endorsed to me. There is no provision in the agreement whereby 
I am required to assign any purported stock interest to any unnamed 
third parties.- (R. 776-77). 
"e. Roland Kaufmann did not have authority to make final 
decisions with regards to Republic International Corporation or 
Radcliffe, assuming that is what Akhavan means by his statement 
contained in paragraph 7 of his Affidavit. Further, Mr. Kaufmann 
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has never used Republic or me as a "front or an Malter~ego" as 
asserted in paragraph 7." (R. 778-79). 
Finally, in his own affidavit, Kaufmann clearly stated that: 
KAUFMANN: 
"Contrary to the allegations of Counterclaimant, I do not own 
any property in the Salt Lake City area, or anywhere in the State 
of Utah. My primary residence and domicile is in Zurich 
Switzerland. 
I am not an officer of Republic International Corporation, and 
was not an officer of that corporation at any time referred to in 
the Counterclaim. 
I am not a shareholder in Republic Corporation, and have not 
been a shareholder at any time referred to in the Counterclaim. 
I am not a shareholder in Republic Corporation, and have not 
been a shareholder at any time referred to in the Counterclaim. 
I do not maintain a place of business or office in the State 
of Utah. On occasional visits to Utah, I have been permitted the 
use of an office at Republic International Corporation. 
I was not a party to any of the agreements referred to in the 
Counterclaim, either in an individual or representative capacity. 
I made no guarantees or commitments, either in an individual or 
representative capacity to Sia Akhavan, and did not advance any 
funds or transfer to General Display Corporation any shares of 
Republic International Stock." (R. 526-27). 
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PROCEDURAL FACTS 
Motion to Dismiss 
The factual and legal bases justifying the assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over Roland Kaufmann were contested several 
times prior to trial. Personal jurisdiction was disputed by 
Radcliffe on Akhavan's motion to join Kaufmann as an additional 
party defendant. (R. 49; 235). It was disputed again pursuant to 
Kaufmann's motion to vacate default certificate which also 
challenged Akhavan's attempted service of process in Switzerland. 
(R. 517; 525). The latter problem was resolved by stipulation of 
counsel in which it was agreed that Kaufmannfs jurisdictional 
objections would be preserved. (R. 543). 
In challenging the personal jurisdiction of the court on his 
motion to dismiss, Kaufmann denied both the accuracy and legal 
sufficiency of Akhavan's allegations that he purposefully took any 
action which would subject him to the jurisdiction of Utah courts. 
(R. 553-55; 545-52; 525-27; 638). He also denied that he owned any 
property in Utah or was involved in the transaction in any way 
other than as the financial advisor and investment banker for 
Republic. Id. Following a nonevidentiary hearing held on March 4, 
1991, the court denied the motion based on the documentary record 
alone, finding that Kaufmann had sufficient minimal contacts with 
the forum so as to satisfy the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78-
27-22 et seq. (1969) and the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (R. 666-
67) . Kaufmann then filed his Answer to Counterclaim preserving his 
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jurisdictional objections as an affirmative defense. (R. 671-79, 
678) . 
Trial Settings 
On December 11, 1991, this case was set for nonjury trial 
commencing on March 24, 1992, (R. 891), and a pretrial settlement 
conference was scheduled in Salt lake City on March 16, 1992. (R. 
893). On January 8, 1992, Kaufmann1s Washington D.C. counsel filed 
a motion for continuance of trial date on the grounds that he was 
scheduled to appear as counsel for plaintiff at a trial in Fairfax 
County, Virginia, commencing on March 23, 1992. (R. 898). 
Although Akhavan's counsel objected to the motion (R. 906), it was 
granted by the court (R. 905), and trial was rescheduled on 
February 10, 1992, to begin on July 7, 1992. (R. 928). 
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel 
Kaufmann was originally represented by the Washington, D.C. 
law firm of METZGER, GORDON, SCULLY & MORTIMER with Leslie Ann 
Haacke as local counsel. (R. 528-31). On May 27, 1992, Ms. Haacke 
notified the court that she had relocated from Salt Lake City to 
Phoenix, Arizona, thus leaving Kaufmann without benefit of any real 
"local" counsel. (R. 931). 
On June 17, 1992, Kaufmann's Washington D.C. lawyer filed a 
notice and motion to withdraw as counsel indicating that because of 
a conflict with his client over payment of attorney's fees, he did 
not intend to appear at trial on July 7, 1992. (R. 959-65). He 
also stated that Kaufmann had indicated that he did not intend to 
have substitute counsel enter an appearance at that time. (R. 
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961). At this point, Kaufmann had no local counsel in Salt Lake 
City to represent him. (R. 931). 
Motion for Entry of Default Judgment 
On June 29, 1992, a pretrial settlement conference was held in 
Salt Lake City. (R. 1007). Although his Washington D. C. counsel 
participated in the conference, Kaufmann himself did not appear. (R 
1036). At the conference, the court required confirmation from 
Kaufmann that he did not object to the withdrawal of his counsel 
and did not intend to appear at trial as a condition of granting 
the motion to withdraw. (R. 1028). The court apparently also 
informed Kaufmann1s counsel that if no appearance were made at 
trial, a default judgment would be entered against his client. (R. 
1036). Akhavanfs counsel served a motion to that effect on July 1, 
1992. (R. 1008). 
On being advised of the situation, Kaufmann immediately wrote 
to the court stating that he could not attend trial on July 7, 
1992, for financial reasons, and requesting a continuance of trial 
date until September or October, 1992, to allow sufficient time 
for new Utah counsel to be retained and prepare his defense. (R. 
1037). He also requested that his trial counsel be retained until 
July 31, 1992. (R. 1037). His Washington D.C. counsel 
concurrently filed a memorandum in opposition to Akhavan's motion 
for entry of default judgment on July 1, 1992, citing a conflict of 
interest with his client. (R. 1027-29). 
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Motion for Continuance 
Kaufmann then retained Paul M. Durham of DURHAM & EVANS in 
Salt Lake City who entered a special appearance on July 2, 1992, 
for the sole purpose of moving for a continuance of trial date on 
the grounds that Kaufmann genuinely desired to appear at trial and 
defend the action; that he believed he had substantial and 
meritorious defenses to all of the claims; that he would take all 
necessary action to assist in preparation for trial; that he and 
his original counsel had encountered serious and substantial 
disagreements and misunderstandings to the degree that original 
counsel could not continue to represent him; that the Motion to 
Withdraw had not been ruled upon; and that, due to the complexity 
of the case, new counsel could not adequately prepare for trial 
without a continuance. (R. 979). Following a brief hearing on 
July 6, 1992, the court denied the motion. (R. 1044). 
Trial was held as scheduled the next day in the absence of 
both Kaufmann and his trial counsel. (R. 1042-43). Kaufmann1s 
special counsel appeared briefly to make a record with respect to 
his motion for continuance and was excused. (R. 1043). The court 
then entered Kaufmann's default and proceeded to take unchallenged 
testimony from Akhavan and his witnesses on the issues of liability 
and damages. (R. 1043-47). 
Following the hearing, the court entered a default judgment 
against Kaufmann together with a specific jurisdictional finding to 
the effect that "Kaufmann was properly served with process in this 
action and by stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's 
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jurisdiction over him." (Finding of Fact No. 1, R. 1043; 
Conclusion of Law No. 1, R. 1047). The court also awarded Akhavan 
both compensatory and consequential damages for breach of contract 
and fraud. (R. 1045; 1047-48, R. 1050). This appeal followed. 
(R. 1066). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING KAUFMANN!S MOTION 
FOR CONTINUANCE UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
A. The Lower Court Must Act Reasonably in Denying a Motion 
for Continuance. 
The trial court has discretion to continue a trial upon a 
showing of good cause. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 40(b). 
The trial court's action in denying a continuance will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the court has abused that discretion by 
acting unreasonably. Hardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917 (Utah App. 1989); 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1988); Miller Pontiac, 
Inc. v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981). 
In determining whether to grant a continuance, the trial court 
should consider the facts and circumstances of each particular 
case, weighing the rights of the party requesting it against the 
harm that may result from delay. Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 
(Colo. 1985); 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Continuance §4 (1990). 
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The trial court's legitimate concern for prevention of delay 
in the trial of cases should not prejudice the substantial rights 
of a party by forcing him to go to trial without being able to 
fairly present his case. Yates v. Superior Court In and For Pima 
County, 120 Ariz. 436, 586 P.2d 997 (Ariz. App. 1978); Gonzales v. 
Harris, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842 (1975). 
B. Kaufmann*s Due Process Right to an Evidentiary Hearing on 
the Jurisdictional Issue was Entitled to Considerable 
Weight in the Balancing Process. 
Kaufmann was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 
objections to the court's assertion of specific personal 
jurisdiction over him under guidelines recently approved by the 
Utah Supreme Court, since Akhavan's allegations were specifically 
controverted by affidavit and because determination of the 
jurisdictional issue turns on the same facts as the merits of the 
case. Anderson v. American Soc'v of Plastic Surgeons 807 P.2d 825 
(Utah 1990) . 
In determining whether to grant a continuance, the court 
should examine the reasonableness of a request in light of the 
tradition that a party should be afforded every opportunity to be 
in attendance at trial. Bairas v. Johnson/ 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 
P.2d 375 (1962) . 
C. The Lower Court's Denial of a Continuance was 
Unreasonable Under the Particular Circumstances of This 
Case. 
1. Kaufmann is a foreign, nonresident defendant residing in 
Zurich, Switzerland who consistently challenged the court's 
jurisdiction over him. 
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2. Kaufmann's out-of-state counsel moved to withdraw just 
three weeks before trial, indicating that he did not intend to 
appear at the trial, 
3. The attorney-client relationship between Kaufmann and his 
out-of-state counsel had so completely broken down by this time 
that Kaufmann could not be adequately represented without first 
obtaining new counsel. 
4. Kaufmann retained new Utah counsel on July 1, 1992, who 
immediately moved for a continuance on the grounds, inter alia/ 
that the case was so complex that he could not adequately defend 
without additional time to prepare for trial. 
5. Kaufmann believes he has substantial and meritorious 
defenses to all of Akhavan's claims and genuinely desires to appear 
and defend the action. 
6. Akhavan failed to demonstrate any specific prejudice 
occasioned by a two or three month delay beyond the burden of the 
delay itself. 
7. Kaufmann has suffered severe prejudice by having a 
default judgment entered against him based in part upon a 




THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
AGAINST KAUFMANN UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, 
Because of the close connection between Kaufmann's motion for 
continuance and Akhavan's motion for entry of default judgment, the 
same factors considered above in balancing the competing interests 
of the parties are relevant here- In addition, this court has 
observed that a default judgment is an unusually harsh remedy that 
should be meted out with caution. Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 
(Utah App. 1991). See also, Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1977); Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. Tolbert, 402 P.2d 
703 (Utah 1965); Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1953). 
This is not a case of willfulness, bad faith, or fault which 
justifies entry of default judgment as a sanction against a 
noncomplying party. See, Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 7 68 
P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). 
The reasonableness of the court's ruling in this case must be 
viewed from the factual and legal context in which it occurred. 
Kaufmann was a foreign, nonresident living thousands of miles from 
the forum who had effectively lost the adequate representation of 
his out-of-state counsel three weeks prior to trial. He had 
previously challenged the courtfs personal jurisdiction over him 
and was entitled under Utah law to an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue. He took immediate steps to secure new Utah counsel and move 
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for a continuance once he had been advised of the court's pretrial 
rulings. He was prejudiced by entry of default judgment in that he 
was deprived of a full and fair opportunity to present his case in 
court. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT KAUFMANN 
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT'S JURISDICTION 
IN THIS CASE. 
The court fs finding of fact and conclusion of law that 
Kaufmann voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by 
stipulation in this case in clearly erroneous, since it is 
unsupported by any evidence whatsoever and is in fact directly 
contradicted by all of the evidence in the record. 
Kaufmann has been prejudiced by this finding and conclusion, 
since the stated basis of the court's personal jurisdiction over 
him is completely groundless. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES IN THIS CASE, SINCE IT AFFORDED AKHAVAN A 
DOUBLE RECOVERY, 
In Utah, compensatory and consequential damages may be 
recovered for breach of contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 
P.2d 795 (Utah 1985). Recoverable damages for fraud are based upon 
the benefit of the bargain rule. Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 
607 (Utah 1974). Both measures of damages are limited by the rule 
prohibiting a double recovery. Cook Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick/ 664 
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P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983) (contract); Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 
(Utah App. 1992) (fraud). 
In this case, the terms of the contract itself indicate that 
the covenant not to compete was not separately valued. (R. 289-
90). It follows that the consideration given by the buyer for the 
business included payment for the seller's promise not to compete 
for a period of two years after the sale, By permitting Akhavan to 
recover the full amount of the purchase price, the court made him 
whole under the contract and afforded him the full benefit of his 
bargain. To go beyond that and permit additional damages measured 
by the alleged value of honoring his covenant not to compete, the 




THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
KAUFMANNfS MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL DATE, 
BECAUSE ITS RULING HAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE 
PARTICULAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
A, The Lower Court Must Act Reasonably in Denying a Motion 
for Continuance. 
Rule 40(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that 
"upon motion of a party, the court may in its discretion, and upon 
such terms as may be just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding 
upon good cause shown." The rule also provides for the 
26 
preservation of witness1 testimony subject to the same objections 
that may be made with respect to depositions if required by the 
adverse party. Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 40(c). 
The granting of a continuance rests in the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the 
court has abused that discretion by acting unreasonably. Hardy v. 
Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 925-26 (Utah App. 1989), citing Christenson v. 
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 1988), and Miller Pontiac, Inc. 
v. Osborne, 622 P.2d 800, 803 (Utah 1981). In determining whether 
to grant a continuance, the trial court should consider the 
circumstances of each particular case, weighing the rights of the 
party requesting it against the harm that may result from delay. 
Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985); 17 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Continuance §4 (1990). The trial court's legitimate concern for 
prevention of delay in the trial of cases should not prejudice the 
substantial rights of a party by forcing him to go to trial without 
being able to fairly present his case. Yates v. Superior Court In 
and For the County of Pima, 120 Ariz. 436, 586 P.2d 997 (Ariz. App. 
1978); Gonzales v. Harris, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842 (19751. 
In addition to the above, courts have cited several factors to 
be considered in deciding whether to grant a continuance. Abuse of 
discretion may be found, for example, where a party has made timely 
objections, given necessary notice, and made reasonable efforts to 
have a trial date reset for good cause. Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 
P.2d 1375, 1376 (Utah 1977). Other factors include the length of 
the delay requested, whether the delay will prejudice the opposing 
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party, and whether the grant or denial will be in the furtherance 
of justice. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance §4 (1990). 
B. Kaufmann's Due Process Right to an Evidentiary Hearing on 
the Jurisdictional Issue was Entitled to Considerable 
Weight in the Balancing Process. 
Kaufmannfs legal position before trial is another relevant 
factor to consider in determining whether the lower court acted 
unreasonably in denying his subsequent motion for continuance, 
since it raises the level of concern for the adequate protection of 
his due process right to a judgment based upon the constitutional 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). It is 
also in accordance with the view that the court should examine the 
reasonableness of a request for continuance in light of the 
tradition that a party should be afforded every opportunity to be 
in attendance at trial. Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P. 2d 
375 (1962). 
In this case, Akhavan's original contention that the district 
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Kaufmann under the 
state's long arm statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24 (1987), rested 
upon two distinct grounds: (1) maintenance of a residence in Salt 
Lake County; and (2) causing an injury within the state. 
(Counterclaim «[ 4, R. 19). The first ground was subsequently 
discarded, since none of the claims involved in this case arose 
from ownership, use, or possession of the property. Thus the 
remaining justification for assertion of the court's specific 
personal jurisdiction under the pleadings was the "causing of any 
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injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of 
warranty." Utah Code Ann. §78-27-24(3)(1987) . 
The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the guidelines to be 
utilized in analyzing problems of specific personal jurisdiction 
under the long-arm statute. This analysis requires a two-part 
inquiry: (1) Whether the proponent's claims arise from one of the 
activities listed in the statute; and (2) whether the opponent's 
contacts with the forum are sufficient to satisfy the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Arcruello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 
P.2d. 1120 (Utah 1992). Before reaching this stage, however, the 
court must first determine how to proceed when the proponent's 
jurisdictional allegations are controverted by affidavit, and when 
jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the merits of the case. 
This preliminary problem was squarely raised in Anderson v. 
Am. Soc. of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825 (Utah 
1990). In that case, a patient brought an action against a 
nonresident sponsor and medical monitor of an experimental facial 
treatment program. The Third Judicial District Court granted 
motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the basis 
of the pleadings and documentary evidence and the patient appealed. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal and 
remanded for trial on the merits with an order to postpone any 
ruling on personal jurisdiction until after plaintiff had presented 
her case. Anderson, 807 P.2d at 826. 
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In reaching this decision, the Court approved the following 
guidelines for use by the trial court in determining the limits of 
its territorial jurisdiction: 
1. If it proceeds on documentary evidence alone (i.e., 
the first two methods), the plaintiff is only 
required to make a prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction. The plaintiff's factual allegations 
are accepted as true unless specifically 
controverted by the defendant's affidavits or by 
depositions, but any disputes in the documentary 
evidence are resolved in the plaintiff!s favor. 
The trial court must not weigh the evidence unless 
a hearing is held. 
2. Unless an evidentiary hearing is held, the 
plaintiff must prove jurisdiction at trial by a 
preponderance of the evidence after making a prima 
facie showing before trial. When jurisdiction 
turns on the same facts as the merits of the case, 
an evidentiary hearing is inappropriate because it 
infringes on the right to a jury trial and is an 
inefficient use of judicial resources (hearing the 
same evidence twice); in such cases—if the 
plaintiff has made a prima facie showing— 
jurisdiction is determined by trial on the merits. 
Anderson, 807 P.2d at 827. 
In Kaufmann, it is clear that Akhavan's jurisdictional claims 
turn on the same -facts as the merits of the case. In fact, they 
could hardly be otherwise, since his theories of liability turn on 
the nature and content of certain alleged contacts made by Kaufmann 
and his alleged agents over the course of several months. 
The alternative contract and fraud theories of liability 
advanced by Akhavan are all based upon his interpretation of 
Kaufmann1 s role in a series of meetings, negotiations, and 
conversations which occurred in Utah, New York, and Switzerland 
during the latter half of 1989. Kaufmann1s defenses turn on the 
same facts. In short, Kaufmann was either the principal in these 
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business dealings who utilized agents in Utah to accomplish his 
aims, (Akhavan), or he was an investment banker only peripherally 
involved in representing clients holding investments in Republic 
and therefore interested in Republic's business transactions in 
Utah and elsewhere, (Kaufmann). 
In denying Kaufmann's motion to dismiss, the lower court was 
advised of the guidelines set forth in Anderson. (R. 576-77). 
Although it is not altogether clear that the court's order was 
limited to a determination that Akhavan had only made a prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction and that all disputes in the 
documentary record were resolved in his favor as required at this 
stage, the court was nevertheless bound not to weigh the evidence 
until an evidentiary hearing had been held. Anderson, 807 P.2d at 
827. 
Since Kaufmann was effectively precluded as a matter of law 
under Anderson from obtaining an evidentiary hearing on his 
jurisdictional defenses until trial on the merits, it follows that 
he was entitled to such a hearing on due process grounds before the 
court entered its findings against him. Anderson, supra. See also 
Kamdar & Co. v. LaRav Co., Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991). 
This circumstance should be given considerable weight in assessing 
the reasonableness of the lower court's action. 
C. The Lower Court's Denial of a Continuance was 
Unreasonable under the Particular Circumstances of this 
Case. 
In this case, the following facts support the trial court's 
ruling: 
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1. Kaufmann was represented by competent counsel since 
November, 1990, and was aware of the July 7, 1992 trial date. (R. 
1036). 
2. The case was originally set for trial in March, 1992, but 
was continued because of a scheduling conflict on the part of 
Kaufmann's counsel. (R. 898; 1043). 
3. Kaufmann's counsel filed a notice and motion for leave to 
withdraw as counsel on June 17, 1992, just three weeks prior to the 
second date set for trial. (R. 959-65; 1043). 
4. The motion to withdraw was based on the grounds that 
Kaufmann was either unable or unwilling to pay the legal fees due 
and owing his trial counsel. (R. 960). 
5. In his motion to withdraw, Kaufmannfs counsel represented 
to the court that Kaufmann did not intend to have substitute 
counsel enter an appearance and that the motion "is not filed with 
the intent of seeking a delay of trial." (R. 961). 
6. At the pretrial conference held on June 29, 1992, the 
court required confirmation from Kaufmann that he did not intend to 
appear. (R. 1028). 
7. In response, Kaufmann personally advised the court by FAX 
on July 1, 1992, that he was not prepared to go to trial until 
September or October, 1992, for financial reasons, and because he 
needed additional time to obtain new Utah counsel. (R. 1014; 
1016). 
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8. Akhavan's counsel objected to the proposed continuance on 
the grounds that his client should not be burdened by a second 
delay. (R. 1000). 
By contrast, the facts supporting Kaufmann!s motion include 
the following: 
1. Kaufraann is a foreign, nonresident residing in Zurich, 
Switzerland who consistently challenged the court's assertion of 
specific personal jurisdiction over him. (R. 49; 235; 517; 525-27; 
545-55; 638). 
2. Although Kaufmann had been represented by competent 
counsel since November, 1990, his counsel moved to withdraw just 
three weeks before the case was scheduled for trial. (R. 959-65) 
3. Prior to the motion to withdraw, Kaufmannfs local counsel 
relocated her practice to Phoenix, Arizona, thereby leaving 
Kaufmann without benefit of any "local" counsel in Utah. (R. 931). 
The record does not indicate that she took any further steps to 
protect his interests. 
4. The first motion for continuance was filed by Kaufmann1s 
Washington D.C. counsel because of a conflict in his trial 
schedule, not at Kaufmann's insistence. (R. 898). The assertion 
by Akhavan's counsel that "obviously Bloom was not being paid at 
that time" (R. 1000-1001) was presumption on his part rather than 
evidence and should be disregarded. 
5. Kaufmann's own response to the court indicated that he 
strongly denied the allegations and was prepared to go to trial in 
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September/October of 1992, at most, a two to three month delay. 
(R. 1016). 
6. Kaufmann requested additional time in order to obtain new 
counsel in Utah to defend his interests at trial. (R. 1016). 
7. The record clearly indicates that the attorney-client 
relationship between Kaufmann and his Washington D.C. counsel had 
so completely broken down in terms of trust and communication by 
July 1, 1992, that his counsel believed himself to be placed in a 
conflict of interest situation with his own client. (R. 1015; 
1028-29). 
8. Kaufmann advised his new Utah counsel that: 
"(a) he believes he has substantial and meritorious 
defenses to all of the claims of the counterclaimant; 
(b) he genuinely desires to defend this action and is 
willing to appear at trial; 
(c) he will take all necessary action to assist in the 
preparation of the matter for trial and appear at trial; 
(d) he would like me to represent him and will make 
adequate financial arrangements with me to represent him in 
this matter, and 
(e) he and his present attorney have had serious and 
substantial disagreements to the degree that he believes that 
he cannot be adequately represented." (R. 987-88). 
9. Based upon his limited review of the pleadings and his 
conversations with Kaufmann, his new Utah counsel concluded and 
represented by affidavit that "new counsel for Mr. Kaufmann cannot 
34 
adequately be prepared for trial on July 7, 1992, based upon its 
complexity and the detailed factual history associated with the 
claims which are the subject of this action." (R. 988). 
10. By contrast, Akhavan failed to demonstrate any specific 
prejudice to his position occasioned by a two/three month delay 
beyond being "burdened by these tactics to delay the trial again." 
(R. 1000), It should be noted that this assertion by Akhavan' s 
counsel rather surprisingly assumes without any proof that the 
first motion for continuance was a sham to delay the trial. (R. 
919-22). It should be noted further that the combined maximum 
additional time requested in both motions for continuance taken 
together would have extended the trial date from March 1992 to 
October 1992, a time period of seven months. 
In balancing the opposing interests on this issue, appellant 
submits that it was unreasonable for the lower court to deny the 
motion when it became apparent that Kaufmann could not be 
adequately represented at trial on July 7, 1992, and that his 
substantial rights to contest and defend both jurisdictional and 
liability issues would be severely prejudiced by the court's 
decision. It must be remembered that Kaufmann was trying to 
resolve these problems at a great distance, within the context of 
a different legal system, and without benefit of local counsel. By 
contrast, Akhavan was a resident of Salt Lake County, had benefit 
of local counsel, and failed to demonstrate any specific prejudice 
beyond the burden of waiting an additional two to three months to 
go to trial. 
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Under Rule 40(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
lower court could have granted the motion and still preserved the 
testimony of Akhavan and his witnesses at Akhavanfs request. The 
court could also have required Kaufmann to pay the costs occasioned 
by such postponement under Rule 40(b). None of these steps which 
could have mitigated any prejudice to Akhavan was taken. 
Kaufmann demonstrated good cause for his requested 
continuance. In view of his due process right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the jurisdictional question coupled with application of 
the legal principle that the court should examine a request for 
continuance in light of the tradition that a party should be 
afforded every opportunity to appear and defend at trial, the lower 
court acted unreasonably in denying the motion. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ENTERING 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST KAUFMANN, BECAUSE ITS 
RULING WAS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE PARTICULAR FACTS 
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
In his motion for entry of default judgment against Kaufmann 
which was served on July 1, 1992, Akhavan justified such action on 
Kaufmann's failure to personally appear at the pretrial conference 
on June 29 coupled with the statement of his withdrawing counsel 
that Kaufmann was not going to retain new counsel or appear at 
trial. (R. 1004; 1009). As noted above, Kaufmann was in the 
process of obtaining new Utah counsel and seeking a continuance of 
trial date (R. 1037). Akhavan argued that Kaufmann should be 
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sanctioned under Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), and (D) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure for failure to appear as provided in Rule 16(d). 
(R,. 1004) . Although at the pretrial conference, Kaufmann's counsel 
apparently was informed that if Kaufmann failed to appear at trial 
a default judgment would be entered against him, no pretrial order 
to that effect appears in the record. (R. 1036). 
In opposing the motion, Kaufmann's Washington D.C. counsel 
argued that although Kaufmann had been absent from the pretrial 
conference because of the distance involved, he was represented by 
counsel in spite of the fact that counsel had filed a motion to 
withdraw. (R. 1019). He then relayed Kaufmannfs request for a 
continuance noting the communication and conflict of interest 
problems between himself and his client. (R. 1019-20). 
Although in entering its default order and judgment the court 
made no reference to Rule 16(d) or Rule 37(b)(2) in terms of 
sanctions, the order clearly was of that nature since it was based 
upon prior (oral) rulings "that if Kaufmann and his counsel failed 
to appear for trial, a default judgment would be entered." (R. 
1051). Kaufmann and his counsel were aware of these rulings prior 
to trial. (R. 1036-37). 
Because of the close connection between Kaufmannfs motion for 
continuance and Akhavan's motion for entry of default judgment, the 
same factors considered above in balancing the competing interests 
of the parties are relevant here. In addition, however, this court 
has observed that a default judgment is an unusually harsh remedy 
that should be meted out with caution. Darrington v. Wade, 812 
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P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), See also, Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1977); Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp, v. Tolbert, 402 
P.2d 703 (Utah 1965); Warner v. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P.2d 741 (Utah 
1953). 
In this case, the record indicates that the attorney-client 
relationship between Kaufmann and his Washington D.C. counsel had 
deteriorated to the point that he believed he could not be 
adequately represented; that he sought to retain new Utah counsel 
who immediately moved for a continuance of trial date; that he 
believes that he has substantial and genuine defenses to Akhavan's 
claims; and th#t he genuinely desires to defend this action and 
will take all necessary steps to appear at trial. (R. 987-88). He 
also attempted to explain to the court by letter dispatched from 
his home in Switzerland that he was unable to attend trial on July 
7, 1992, because of financial difficulties. (R. 1037). 
In short, this is simply not a case of "willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault" which justifies entry of default judgment as a 
sanction against a noncomplying party. See, Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 
v. Schettlerr 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989). On the contrary, the 
record demonstrates that Kaufmann immediately responded to the 
court's pretrial ruling of June 29, 1992, by retaining new counsel 
and moving for £ continuance three days later. (R. 979; 1036-37). 
In addition, he attempted without benefit of counsel to demonstrate 
his inability to appear on July 7, 1992, for financial reasons. 
(R. 1037). It should also be noted that the court did not rule on 
Kaufmannfs motion for continuance until July 6, 1992, approximately 
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twenty-four hours prior to trial, despite his motion for an 
expedited hearing- (R. 983; 1043). 
As indicated above, the reasonableness of the court's ruling 
in this case must be viewed from the factual and legal context in 
which it occurred. Kaufraann was a foreign, nonresident defendant 
living thousands of miles from the forum who had effectively lost 
the adequate representation of his out-of-state counsel just prior 
to trial. He had previously challenged the court's personal 
jurisdiction over him and was entitled under Utah law to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue. He took immediate steps to 
secure new Utah counsel and move for a continuance once he had been 
advised of the court's pretrial rulings. He was prejudiced by 
entry of default judgment in that he was deprived of a full and 
fair opportunity to present his case in court. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT KAUFMANN 
VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT!S JURISDICTION 
IN THIS CASE, SINCE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD TO SUPPORT SUCH A FINDING. 
After conducting a hearing in Kaufmann's absence, the lower 
court entered the following Finding of Fact No. 1 and Conclusion of 
Law No. 1 on the jurisdictional issue: 
FINDING OF FACT NO. 1 
"Kaufmann was properly served with process in this action and 
by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's jurisdiction 
over him. Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been represented by 
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competent counsel from the law firm of Metzer, Gordon, Scully & 
Mortimer and Leslie Ann Haacke, as local counsel." 
CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1 
"Kaufmann was properly served with process in this action and 
by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's jurisdiction 
over him. Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been represented by 
competent counsel from the law firm of Metzger, Gordon, Scully & 
Mortimer and Leslieann Haacke, as local counsel." 
In attempting to marshall the evidence in favor of the court's 
finding on this issue, counsel for appellant has been unable to 
locate a single fact supporting it in the record or transcript of 
hearing. The only possibility is a stipulation entered into early 
in the case in which Akhavan agreed to the entry of an order 
vacating a default certificate filed against Kaufmann before he was 
represented by counsel in exchange for Kaufmannfs agreement to 
waive his objections to certain defects in Akhavan1s attempted 
service of process. (R. 543). But this stipulation expressly 
states that Kaufmann has not waived any of his jurisdictional 
defenses. (R. 543). In fact Kaufmann continued to raise those 
defenses below until default judgment was entered against him. (R. 
49; 235; 517; 525-27; 545-55; 638). All of the other stipulations 
deal with routine extensions of time or continuances of hearings 
without mention of any jurisdictional waiver. (R. 659). 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be shown that 
they lack adequate evidentiary foundation. Western Capital & 
Sees., Inc. v. Knudsviq, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
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779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). Conclusions of law are reviewed under a 
correctness of error standard. Bailey v. Call, 7 67 P.2d 138 (Utah 
App.)/ cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Since the strongest case of inadequate or insufficient 
evidence is no evidence at all, this finding and conclusion are 
both clearly erroneous and clearly wrong. 
Kaufmann has been prejudiced by this finding and conclusion 
since they are unsupported by any evidence whatever and purport to 
justify the court's assertion of general personal jurisdiction over 
him in a way which would preclude subsequent collateral attack. 
Such a result is both contrary to law and fundamental fairness and 
should be reversed on this appeal. 
IV. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES IN THIS CASE, SINCE IT AFFORDED AKHAVAN A 
DOUBLE RECOVERY. 
In Utah, recoverable damages for breach of contract include 
both general or compensatory damages, i.e.f those flowing naturally 
from the breach, and consequential damages, i.e. , those reasonably 
within the contemplation of or reasonably foreseeable by the 
parties at the time the contract was made. Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325 P.2d 
906, 907 (1958), citing Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. 
Rep. 145 (1854), Recoverable damages for fraud are based upon the 
"benefit of the bargain" rule. Lamb v. Bancrart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 
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(Utah 1974). In either event, the trial court's award of damages 
will be affirmed on appeal if there is a "reasonable basis in 
evidence" to support it. Katzenberger v. State, 735 P. 2d 405 (Utah 
App. 1987), citing Holman v. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499, 500 (Utah 
1976). 
In this case, the lower court specifically found that the 
terms of the contract included the following: 
a. Purchase price of $300,000 for Akhavan's equity interest 
in General Display; 
b. A covenant by Akhavan not to compete for a period of two 
years; 
c. An agreement to pay Akhavan 25% of the net proceeds from 
any judgment or settlement of a pending lawsuit against the Walt 
Disney Company; and 
d. Attorney's fees payable to the prevailing party in 
litigation. (Finding of Fact No. 9,.R. 1045). 
Following the hearing, the court found that Akhavan was 
entitled to recover damages as follows: 
a. $250,000 for the difference between the contract price 
and current value of General Display. (Since $50,000 had already 
been paid, the total amount recovered equaled the contract price of 
$300,000-); 
b. $168,000 under the covenant not to compete for 2 years; 
c. $43,250 which was 25% of the $173,000 settlement of the 
Walt Disney suit; 
42 
d
- $44,212-50 for attorney's fees and $3,006.59 for costs of 
suit. (Finding of Fact No. 17, R. 1047). 
The court's related Conclusion of Law on damages reads as 
follows: 
"Kaufmann, in connection with negotiations for executing the 
contract with Akhavan, made certain representations to Akhavan 
which Kaufmanri knew to be false and upon which Akhavan relied upon 
entering into the contract with Kaufmann. Kaufmann's breaches and 
misrepresentations have caused Akhavan to suffer damages in the 
amount set forth in Exhibit 3. Akhavan is entitled to judgment 
against Kaufitiann in the amount of $553,563.53 and costs of 
$3,006.59. (Conclusion of Law No. 7, R. 1048). 
Although it is not altogether clear from the court's 
Conclusion of Law No. 7 whether damages are being awarded for 
breach of contract, fraud, or both together, Kaufmann submits that 
the award was contrary to law in all events, since it permitted 
Akhavan to re^p
 a double recovery. 
Even though recovery for breach of contract may include both 
compensatory $nd consequential damages, and may provide plaintiff 
the full benefit of the bargain in fraud, a party's damages are 
nevertheless limited in either case by the rule which prohibits a 
doable recovei:y. rn contract cases, for example, it is well 
settled that an obligee is entitled to be paid in full but cannot 
exact double recovery. Cook Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 
(Utah 1983), citing Brigham City Sand & Gravel v. Machinery Center, 
Inc., 613 P.2d 510, 511-12 (Utah 1980). In fraud cases, a double 
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recovery is contrary to the benefit of the bargain rule. Brown v. 
Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case, Kaufmann submits that the agreed upon price for 
the business necessarily included the value of Akhavanfs covenant 
not to compete, since it was not valued separately as was the 25% 
interest in the Disney suit. (Agreement, Addendum F, R. 287-90). 
See also, Rudd v. Parks, 588 P.2d 709 (Utah 1978) (awarding damages 
for a covenant not to compete which was separately valued as part 
of the total purchase price). Had Akhavan elected to violate the 
covenant, he would have been liable for damages which properly 
would have been treated as an offset against the amount owing for 
the purchase price. In short, had Akhavan been paid the full 
purchase price of $300,000, he would have had no action for breach 
of contract or fraud, and would have received the full benefit of 
the bargain. By allowing him to recover the full amount of the 
purchase price in compensatory damages, plus the alleged value of 
his covenant not to compete, the court permitted him to exact a 
double recovery in contravention of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Roland Kaufmann was denied a full and fair opportunity to 
appear and defend at trial by the court's adverse rulings in this 
case. He was prejudiced at the entry of default judgment against 
him based upon a jurisdictional finding which lacks any basis 
whatsoever in the evidence. He was further prejudiced by an 
excessive award of damages which is contrary to law. For these and 
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the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court should be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
DATED this 3^/ day of March, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES 
By 
Paul M. Durham, Esq. 
G. Richard Hill, Esq. 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Roland Kaufmann 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
TabB 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submit-
ting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim 
arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within 
this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a 
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendent had 
no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives 
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine pater-
nity for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 3; 1983, ch. 
160, § 1; 1987, ch. 35, § 1. 
TabC 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 16 
Hales, 656 P.2d 423 (Utah 1982); Alpine Credit 
Union v. Moeller, 656 P.2d 988 (Utah 1982); 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1982); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 
P.2d 372 (Utah 1983); Bushnell Real Estate, 
Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983); Call 
v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 
1986); Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987); Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 
P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Oates v. 
Chavez, 749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988); Galloway v. 
Afco Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 
P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wanlass v. D 
Land Title, 790 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinger, 793 P.2d 393 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Sneddon v. Graham, 175 
Utah Adv. Rep. 13 (Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading 
§§ 289 to 295, 306 et seq., 329 to 331. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 275 to 338. 
A.L.R. — Right to amend pending personal 
injury action by including action for wrongful 
death after statute of limitations has run 
against independent death action, 71 A.L.R.3d 
933. 
Amendment of pleading after limitation has 
run, so as to set up subsequent appointment as 
executor or administrator of plaintiff who pro-
fessed to bring the action in that capacity with-
out previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th 
198. 
Amendment of pleading to add, substitute, 
or change capacity of, party plaintiff as relat-
ing back to date of original pleading, under 
Rule 15(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
so as to avoid bar of limitations, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 
233. 
What constitutes "prejudice" to party who 
objects to evidence outside issues made by 
pleadings so as to preclude amendment of 
pleadings under Rule 15(b) of Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 448. 
Construction and application of Rule 15(d) of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for 
allowance of supplemental pleadings setting 
forth transactions, occurrences, or events sub-
sequent to original pleading, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 
129. 
Rule 15(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
or state law as governing relation back of 
amended pleading, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 880. 
Key Numbers. — Pleading «=» 229 to 286. 
Rule 16. Pretrial conferences, scheduling, and manage-
ment conferences. 
(a) Pretrial conferences. In any action, the court in its discretion or upon 
motion of a party, may direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepre-
sented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial 
for such purposes as: 
(1) expediting the disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that the case will not 
be protracted for lack of management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities; 
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more thorough prepara-
tion; 
(5) facilitating the settlement of the case; and 
(6) considering other matters as may aid in the orderly disposition of 
the case. 
(b) Scheduling and management conferences. In any action, in addition 
to any pretrial conferences that may be scheduled, the court in its discretion 
may direct that a scheduling or management conference be held. The court 
may direct the attorneys or unrepresented parties to appear before the court. 
Scheduling or management conferences may also be held by way of telephone 
conferencing between the court and counsel as the particular case may re-
quire. Decisions and agreements reached at scheduling and management con-
ferences may be formally made an order of the court. At the conference, the 
court may consider the following matters: 
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(1) the formation and simplification of the issues, including the elimi-
nation of frivolous claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or advisability of joining additional parties or amend-
ment of pleadings; 
(3) the completion of outstanding discovery; 
(4) the time for filing and hearing of motions; 
(5) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents 
which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authentic-
ity of documents, and advance rulings from the court on admissibility of 
evidence; 
(6) the identification of witnesses and documents, the need for and 
schedule for filing and exchanging trial briefs, and the dates for a final 
pretrial and scheduling conference and for a trial; 
(7) the advisability of referring matters to a lower court that has appro-
priate jurisdiction to hear the case; 
(8) the possibility of settlement; 
(9) the need for adopting special procedures for managing particularly 
difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple 
parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems; 
(10) the form and substance of a pretrial order, if it is determined that 
a formal pretrial order is necessary in the particular case; and 
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the case. 
(c) Final pretrial or settlement conferences. In any action where a final 
pretrial conference has been ordered, it shall be held as close to the time of 
trial as reasonable under the circumstances. The conference shall be attended 
by at least one of the attorneys who will conduct the trial for each of the 
parties, and the attorneys attending the pretrial, unless waived by the court, 
shall have available, either in person or by telephone, the appropriate parties 
who have authority to make binding decisions regarding settlement. 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or 
pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unpre-
pared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails 
to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may 
make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of 
the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any 
other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney representing 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncom-
pliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless the court finds that the 
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make 
an award of expenses unjust. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 




Amendments to pleadings. 
Disputed issues of law. 
Pretrial order. 
—Amendment. 
Conformance to evidence. 
Good cause. 
Not allowed. 
Opportunity to meet issue. 
—Conclusiveness. 
—Effect. 
Control of issues. 
—Failure to comply. 
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Rule 37 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
their authenticity, to accept a copy of defen-
dant's written admissions served upon plaintiff 
as compliance with the rules; where the trial 
court chose the latter option, it was proper to 
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admis-
sions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v. 
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982). 
—Failure to respond. 
Objectionable matter. 
Even if a request for an admission is objec-
tionable, if a party fails to object and fails to 
respond to the request, then that party should 
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v. 
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 
1985). 
Prison inmate. 
When inmate served requests for admissions 
and interrogatories on prison officials in action 
for recovery of value of personal property taken 
from him, on failure of officials to respond to 
the requests, apply for extension of time, or 
move to amend or withdraw their admissions 
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were 
deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled 
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Motion to dismiss. 
Tolling. 
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect 
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for ad-
missions which are not answered within 45 
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for 
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Punitive damages. 
Where plaintiff requests an admission of pu-
nitive damages in an amount unrelated to ac-
tual damages, the court, as a matter of equity, 
must intervene and examine the admission. 
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151, 
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110. 
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure tes-
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis-
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and 
rules, to respond to request for admission of 
facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
A.L.R.3d 756. 
Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
admissions under state discovery rules, 8 
A.L.R.4th 728. 
Permissible scope, respecting nature of in-
quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
Key Numbers. — Discovery «=> 121 to 129. 
Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions, 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner, 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. II a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a^  contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
107 
Rule 37 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, t;he court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. § 78-32-1 et seq. 
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a jury trial was made, or that any objection or Rule 38, where plaintiff was not prejudiced 
exception was made at any time during trial thereby James Mfg Co v Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
against right of the court to try the case with- 210, 390 P 2d 127 (1964) 
out a jury, it would be presumed on appeal that 
a trial by jury was waived Perego v Dodge, 9 —Right. 
Utah 3, 33 P 221 (1893), affd, 163 U S 160,16
 n . f i f, Q . _ 
S Ct 971, 41 L Ed 113 (1896) " ~ ^ Q m e ^ vf • u 
This rule gives the right to have any legal 
Trial by jury. issue of fact tried by a jury upon proper de-
Grant of jury trial. mand, and plaintiff m an action to quiet title to 
mining claims was entitled to a jury trial on 
——Absence of demand.
 l s s u e s o f f a c t Holland v Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 
Court did not abuse its discretion in granting 327 p 2d 250 (1958) 
jury trial to defendant, under this rule, over 
plaintiffs objections although defendant had Cited in Randall v Tracy Collins Trust Co , 
not made proper demand for jury trial under 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 P 2d 480 (1956) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d — 47 Am Jur 2d Jury §§ 57, of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, authonz-
58, 75A Am Jur 2d Trial § 714 et seq mg it to order jury trial notwithstanding 
C.J.S. — 50 C J S Juries §§ 98 to 105, 88 party's failure to make seasonable demand for 
C J S Trial §§ 20, 203, 547 et seq
 j u r y , 6 A L R Fed 217 
A.L.R. — When does jeopardy attach in a Key Numbers. — Jury <&=> 25, Trial <s=» 10, 
non-jury trial, 49 A L R 3d 1039 x34> 357 e t s e q 
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b) 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for 
the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties 
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such 
other manner as the courts may deem expedient Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute 
(b) Postponement of the trial. Upon motion of a party, the court may m 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of 
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon 
good cause shown If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of 
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and shall show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to 
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if 
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and 
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and ex-
cluded as improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground 
(c) Taking testimony of witnesses present. If required by the adverse 
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have 
the testimony of any witness present taken, m the same manner as if at the 
trial, and the testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
effect, and subject to the same objections that may be made with respect to a 
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) [Rule 32 (c)(3)(A) and 
(B)]. 
Compiler's Notes. — Following the amend- Subdivision (a) of this rule is similar to Rule 
ment of Rule 32, effective January 1, 1987, the 40, F R C P 
reference to Rule 32(c)(1) and (2), at the end of Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
Subdivision (c), should now be to Rule mgs to conform to evidence, continuance upon, 
32(c)(3)(A) and (B) Rule 15(b) 
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ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
C>nH5 UNION I'ARK CENTER 
S U I T E r,:)r> 
MinVALE. UTAH S-UM7 
TELEPHONE HO 1/521 •",()()() 
TELEFAX 801/:|5!)2H:1<> 
Member of I IK; California liar 
No( admitted in the State of I Hah 
October 19, 1989 
Sia Akhavan 
643 17th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
RE: 
Dear Sin: 
Memorandum of Oral Agreement by and Between Robert D. Radcliffe 
and Sia Akhavan RE: General Display Corporation 
This letter constitutes a written memorandum of oral agreement by and between 
Robert D. Radcliffe (herein "RADCLIFFE"), the undersigned, and Mr. Sia Akhavan 
(herein "AKHAVAN") concerning RADCLIFFE's purchase of AKHAVAN's ownership 
interest in General Display Corporation (hereinafter S>GDCN), which may or may not 
include shares of common stock. The agreement contains the following terms and 
conditions: 
'• SALE AND PURCHASE OF STOCK OR OTHER INTERESTS. 
RADCLIFFE hereby agrees to purchase from AKHAVAN all of 
AKHAVAN's shares of common stock, or all of his right, title and 
interest in and to GDC which, at closing, shall constitute 50% equity 
interest in said company. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for said shares of stock or 
equity interest shall total Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000). 
3. ADDITIONAL PURCHASE BONUS: In the event the net earnings of 
GDC equal or exceed ten percent (10%) of invested capital at the end of 
twenty-four (24) months after close of escrow, then AKHAVAN shall be 
paid an additional purchase bonus of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($200,000) payable in cash. "Net Earnings" and "invested capital" shall 
be defined and me amount determined by GDC ?»ndi\OTs and sh?A\ appty 
to the latest twelve (12) month reporting period covered by the normal 
company audit reporting period. 
4. PAYMENT OF PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price shall be paid by 
the sum of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) at the closing of the 
purchase transaction, and a secured promissory note in the amount of 
Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) payable in eighteen (18) 
equal monthly installments of principal, plus accrued interest on the 
unpaid balance at the rate of 10% per annum. The first payment shall 
commence 60 days from the close of escrow. 
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5. SECURITY FOR PROMISSORY NOTE. As security for the payment of 
the Promissory Note described above, RADCLIFFE agrees to pledge Five 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000) worth of issued and outstanding 
Republic International Corporation stock owned by RADCLIFFE with its 
value being determined by the slocks7 price on the over-the-counter 
market on the date of closing. Every six months following execution of 
the definite agreement contemplated herein, and until the Promissory 
Note is fully paid, the value of RADCLIFFE's stock shall be reassessed, 
and should its value decline, sufficient numbers of shares shall be 
deposited with the escrow agent to cure said deficiency, PROVIDED, 
HOWEVER, RADCLIFFE shall not be required to maintain the value of 
the pledged stock hereunder in excess of double the then outstanding 
balance of the Promissory Note. 
6. ESCROW FOR PLEDGED SECURITIES. The definitive agreement 
contemplated herein shall establish an escrow at the law offices of Kruse, 
Landa & Maycock, c/o Jim Kruse, Eighth Floor, Valley Tower, 50 West 
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, upon terms and conditions 
established by Kruse, Landa & Maycock and mutually approved by 
RADCLIFFE and AKHAVAN. 
7. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES BY AKHAVAN. AKHAVAN 
represents and warrants to RADCLIFFE as follows: 
a. That he owns the subject interests to be purchased hereunder and 
that they are not encumbered in any manner. 
b. That GDC is a corporation in good standing under the laws of the 
Stale of Utah and that he has the requisite authority thereunder 
to sell the shares to RADCLIFFE. 
all financial statements and sjmilgjLS&prt 
or tcuafty^niirdparty have been prepared 
suniia£--£ 
RADCEITTE-pTC^ 
by GDC under^JCHAVT^?^ and, to the 
best^Jris^lcnowledge, they are true and corr 
Xi. Si of his knowledge, while acting 
GDC, he caused ail tax^Jli&w? b^S^&raTI^d^siatP^ to have 
been fl 
That he has or will disclose to RADCLIFFE all contracts, leases, 
agreements, joint ventures, licenses, financing arrangements, 
permits, and any other binding arrangement known to him which 
would have a material effect on this transaction and the operation 
of GDC. 
That to the best of his knowledge GDC has good and marketable dtf\£~ 
title to all of its property, froo and clear of all lioTO/^ft^tga-gfrs, r ^ W 
.pledgor ftncmnbrancae, proprietary inl:erc3tey^nd/QiLchai^es-Qf-al4> 
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>usiness of GDC and curr^ru^^ patents! 
inventions, jra^e^@cretS7i<iTOW-hdw and ^ifidential.informatioif-
^olated4o4^e business-of^EXj. Furthermore, that all 
such proprietary and intangible rights have been securedby GDC 
by appropriate protective measures and that there are no known 
disclosures or publications of said information to third parties. 
Moreover, that there are no known claims by third parties, 
including employees or agents, for any equitable interest in said 
proprietary rights. 
g. That, to the best of his knowledge, there are no actions, suils, 
proceedings, arbitrations or litigation of any kind pending or 
threatened against GDC or its business or assets except for that 
certain lawsuit entitled General Display Corporation v. The Walt 
Disney Company, Civil No. 89-C-892-I, presently pending, in thpj 
United States District Court for the District of Utah/TAKHAVAN 
specifically warrants and represents that this particular lawsuit is 
an asset of GDC and that he has no interest in it whatsoever. In 
the event GDC prosecutes this claim, GDC shall pay AKHAVAN 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the net proceeds after all costs of 
litigation, including attorneys7 fees, from settlement or judgment. 
CLOSING PROCEDURES. The closing of this transaction is therefore 
contemplated to take place on Friday, October 20, 1989, at the offices of 
ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE, 6985 Union Park Center, Suite 535, Midvale, 
Utah, or at such other date and time as may be mutually agreeable in 
writing between the parties hereto. 
INDEMNIFICATION. Immediately upon the close of this transaction, # 
RADCLIFFE shall convene a shareholders' meeting and vote his shares ' 
to approve the indemnification of AKHAVAN by the corporation from 
and against any debts and obligations of the corporation which have 
been disclosed to RADCLIFFE. This contemplated indemnification shall 
include any GDC obligations as to equipment, real property, loans, notes, 
accounts payable and specifically the presently pending assessment for 
unpaid withholding taxes asserted by the Internal Revenue Service. 
COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE. Subsequent to the consummation of 
this transaction and the termination of AKHAVAN's employment by 
GDC, whichever occurs first, AKHAVAN agrees not to establish without 
prior written approval any firm or corporation, or enter into any 
employment, or to provide any services whatsoever to third parties 
which would be competitive in any manner with the business of GDC, 
including but not limited to, soliciting any business whatsoever from 
GDC's existing customers as set forth in Exhibit A hereto. This covenant 
not to compete shall terminate two years after the close of escrow 
hereunder. This covenant not to compete shall have no territorial limits 
with regard to the persons or entities disclosed on Exhibit A, however 
shall be limited to the states of Utah, Arizona, Nevada, California, 
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Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana and Colorado as to all other 
persons or entities. 
11. DISPUTES. Any dispute which might arise under the terms of this 
agreement shall be resolved under the laws of the State of Utah and any 
lawsuit arising out of this agreement shall be instituted in a state or 
federal court in the State of Utah. The'prevailing party in any such suit 
shall be entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 
12. ASSIGNMENT. RADCLIFFE may assign his rights and obligations under 
this agreement with the prior written approval of AKHAVAN. 
Reasonable approval shall not be withheld so long as AKHAVAN retains 
the security set forth in paragraph 4 herein. 
13. INVESTMENT REPRESENTATION. RADCLIFFE understands that the 
shares of GDC stock have not been registered and that they are being 
offered for sale pursuant to an exemption from registration under the 
Securities Act of 1933; that there is no assurance that the exemption is 
available; that the shares will be subject to statutory restrictions on resale; 
and that the shares will be delivered with restrictive provisions imprinted 
thereon. 
RADCLIFFE represents that he has such knowledge and experience in 
financial and business matters that he has made an informed investment 
decision and that he is purchasing this investment as an investment 
without the present intent to dispose of it by resale other than as 
lepresented in paragraph 12 herein. In the event RADCLIFFE assigns 
his right to purchase to another person or entity pursuant to paragraph 
12, then said party shall execute this paragraph upon transfer. 
Please sign in the space provided below indicating vour acceptanc 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED THIS .2? day of / / T ^ , 1989 
BY: 
"Robert D. Radcliffe 
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July 7, 1992 
MR. HOLBROOK: First witness we would call would 
be Sia Akhavan. 
THE COURT: Come forward and be sworn. 
SIA AHKAVAN 
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn 
was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOLBROOK: 
Q I will try to make this as brief as possible. 
Could you please state your name and address for the 
record, please? 
A Sia Akhavan, residing at 643 17th Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84101. 
Q Are you currently a United States citizen? 
A I am and have been for seven years. 
Q When did you first come to the United States? 
A 1981. 
Q You have been here for approximately eleven 
years? 
A That is correct. 
Q Could you briefly describe your work experience 
when you arrived in the United States, commercial sign 
business? 
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A When I first came to the United States, I 
proceeded to purchase Electronic Message Center and sell 
advertising on them. A year after that, I had proceeded to 
manufacture them and have been in the business of 
manufacturing signs since then. 
Q Did there come a time when you obtained an 
ownership interest in a sign company called General 
Display? 
A That is correct. That was in 1987. 
Q Did there also come a time when you learned 
someone was interested in buying your interest in General 
Display? 
A September 1989. 
Q Who did you learn that from? 
A From Joel LaSalle. 
Q What did he tell you? 
A He told me that Mr. Kaufman was interested in 
purchasing my interest in General Display, for the purpose 
of putting or merging it with a publicly-held company. 
Q Did he set up a meeting with Kaufman to discuss 
the purchase? 
A He did. 
Q And describe that meeting? 
A The meeting took place at his offices in Salt 
Lake City with two of his agents, Mr. Radcliffe and also 
4 
Mr. Manual Floor. 
Q Approximately when that was meeting? 
A Early October 1989. 
Q What did you discuss in this meeting? 
A We discussed Mr. Radcliffe—I mean Mr. Kaufman's 
interest in purchasing my interest in General Display for 
the purposes of merging it with the public-held company. 
We also discussed prices. 
Q Did you reach an ultimate resolution as to what 
price Kaufman was willing to pay for your interest in 
General Display? 
A We did. 
Q Did you agree on any terms on how that price 
would be paid? 
A No. The terms were to be negotiated over the 
next few days. 
Q Did they tell you why Kaufman wanted to purchase 
your company? 
A They explained that he had made a commencement 
to a company called F. N. Wolf. He desperately needed my 
company to merge with that publicly-held company. 
Q Did you ever meet again with Radcliffe and Floor 
to discuss the terms of the purchase price? 
A We did but we didn't come to any terms. 
Q So what happened after that? 
5 
A Mr. Kaufman called me from Switzerland and he 
informed me that he was flying to Salt Lake to work out the 
conditions of the purchase. He assured me we would come to 
an agreement. I wouldn't have any further problems, 
Q Did he come to Salt Lake City? 
A He did very shortly after that. 
Q Met with him to negotiate these terms? 
A I did at his request. 
Q Please describe that meeting. 
A The meeting took place in his offices in Fort 
Union Boulevard, and we sat across the table and we 
negotiated the terms and conditions of the sale with him. 
Q Let me hand you what's been marked plaintiff's 
one. Can you identify that document? 
A Yes. 
Q Can you describe that document? 
A It's an agreement under which I sold my interest 
in General Display to Mr. Kaufman. 
Q Does this contain the terms that you and Mr. 
Kaufman agreed to at that meeting you previously described? 
A It does. 
Q Okay. Can you tell us what happened after the 
meeting was over? After you reached an agreement with 
respect to the terms, what happened? 
A Mr. Kaufman called Mr. Radcliffe into the room 
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and he asked Mr. Radcliffe — told Mr. Radcliffe about the 
terms we had settled on. And he told him to go ahead and 
draft the document, and he told him to go ahead and sign 
the document on his behalf and purchase the stock in his 
behalf. 
Q Is exhibit 1 the document that was drafted by 
Radcliffe pursuant to Mr. Kaufman's instructions? 
A It is. 
Q Does it contain the signatures of you and 
Radcliffe? 
A It does. 
Q We would ask for admission of exhibit 1. 
THE COURT: It may be admitted. What was Mr. 
Radcliffe1s interest in this agreement? 
A He was the agent of Mr. Kaufman. As an 
attorney, he was acting on his behalf. 
MR. HOLBROOK: I have an extra copy, if Your 
Honor would like. 
THE COURT: I would appreciate it. 
MR. HOLBROOK: All right. 
Q Mr. Akhavan, if you would look at page one on 
paragraph fourf it states the fifty thousand dollars would 
be paid as an initial payment of the purchase price. Do 
you see that? 
A I do. 
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Q Was that fifty thousand dollars paid by Kaufman? 
A It was paid by Mr. Kaufman. 
Q How do you know that? 
A I received the check and I proceeded to cash the 
check and they told me there wasn't sufficient funds. I 
called Mr. Kaufman's office, his secretary Carol, told me 
that that was impossible, that Mr. Kaufman had sent the 
money and she told me to go ahead and take a trip down. By 
the time I get there, she would have it resolved. When I 
went down there, she smiled and said that Kaufman had sent 
the money into the wrong account and she just had to make 
the transfer. And she told me to go ahead and go to the 
bank. I proceeded to go to the bank and cashed the check 
at that time. 
Q She had told that you Kaufman had wired the 
money over from Switzerland into the wrong account or that 
she would transfer it into the proper account so you could 
cash the check? 
A That is correct. 
Q Paragraph four calls for payment of two hundred 
fifty thousand dollars over eighteen months. Do you see 
that provision? 
A I do. 
Q Was that money ever paid to you? 
A It was not. 
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Q When the first installment of that money was not 
paid, what actions did you undertake to try to collect 
that? 
A I proceeded to call Mr. Kaufman in Switzerland. 
After many conversations with, I believe, his secretary, 
she told me that Mr. Kaufman was to be in Salt Lake City 
shortly after that. So I — 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt. I should be aware 
of what is going on here. I have had this case on my desk 
many times, but the agreement is between Radcliffe and 
Akhavan. How does Kaufman become involved i n — 
MR. HOLBROOK: Radcliffe, that's what I am trying 
to establish. 
THE COURT: He was an agent? 
MR. HOLBROOK: Acting as an agent. 
THE COURT: There's nothing in this agreement 
speaking of a principal/agency relationship. The agreement 
is between Mr. Akhavan and Mr. Radcliffe. 
MR. HOLBROOK: Right. But it is our contention 
that the agreement — we have two claims, one that 
Radcliffe was acting as his agent, for Mr. Kaufman, and all 
the negotiations took place between Kaufman and Akhavan 
with respect to it. When there was a default, Akhavan 
contacted Kaufman and Kaufman assured he would be paid. 
The two grounds, one, breach of contract, Radcliffe was 
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merely acting as agent for Kaufman, Two, Kaufman was 
either fraudulent or misrepresented all these facts in 
causing Akhavan to execute this agreement. 
You may continue. You were describing when you 
didn't receive payment, you contacted Mr. Kaufman, he was 
on his way to Salt Lake City? 
A I called his office in Salt Lake City and went 
and met with him. He assured me that it was only the 
problem of the banks, and he had wired three months of the 
payments to Salt Lake City, that I was to be receiving it 
very shortly after. 
Q When you contacted Kaufman to make these 
payments of two hundred fifty thousand dollars under the 
contract, did Kaufman ever say, "This is not my contract 
you need to look to Radcliffe for payments"? 
A Not at all. Mr. Kaufman, on other occasions, 
had confirmed that was the contract with him and that he 
was very interested in the meeting we had in a club called 
the New Yorker here in town. He confirmed and thanked me 
for selling him my stock and how it would help him in being 
able to put this in a publicly-held vehicle. 
Q At any time did Kaufman say, "Radcliffe is the 
one that needs to pay this money and I am not obligated?" 
A No. 
Q Did Kaufman in fact represent to you that he was 
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having his money transferred over from Switzerland so he 
would make the three payments under this agreement to bring 
it current? 
A That is correct* 
Q As a result of Kaufman's actions and 
misrepresentations, have you suffered damages as a result 
of this breach of contract? 
A I have. 
Q All right. First of all, in looking at 
paragraph four at the two hundred fifty thousand dollars — 
let me step back. The initial sales price under the 
contract was for three hundred thousand dollars; is that 
correct? 
A That is correct, with a bonus, additional 
purchase bonus. 
Q All right, of the three hundred thousand 
dollars, you were paid fifty thousand dollars? 
A That is correct. 
Q So you have not been paid two hundred fifty 
thousand dollars? 
A That is correct. 
Q All right. If you look on page three under 
paragraph ten, there's a covenant not to compete. What 
does that covenant prevent you from doing? 
A From engaging in any employment related to the 
11 
manufacturing, or selling signs, which was my area of 
expertise. 
Q In fact, you had been engaged in the sign 
business since you arrived in the United States? 
A That is correct. 
Q You owned the sign company? You were an officer 
of that sign company? 
A That is correct. 
Q When you left General Display, what was your 
monthly salary? 
A Ten thousand dollars. 
Q If you were able to compete under this contract 
and either form a new sign company, or go to work for a 
competing sign company, what would you estimate your salary 
would have been? 
A I would estimate it to be more than that, 
because of my experience. 
Q More than ten thousand dollars? 
A That is correct. 
Q All right. But you did not compete? 
A That is correct. 
Q Why didn't you compete? 
A Because I honored my commitment. I have made a 
commitment, based on this contract not to compete. 
Q Did you seek alternative employment during that 
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two year period? 
A I did. 
Q What types of employment, jobs did you seek? 
A Production management. 
Q Of manufacturing plants? 
A Manufacturing plants. 
Q That was your forte in the sign industry 
production management of signs? 
A Among other things. 
Q Did you ever take another job? 
A I did not. 
Q Were any jobs offered to you? 
A They were not. 
Q When you were interviewing, what was the most 
monthly income that you had been — that was available in 
production management? 
A The highest job I applied for was for two 
thousand dollars a month. 
Q I would like to focus on page three paragraph 
7(G) where it refers to a lawsuit entitled General Display 
vs. the Walt Disney Company. Under that provision, it says 
you are entitled to receive twenty-five percent of any of 
the net proceeds from that lawsuit? 
A Correct. 
Q Just briefly describe how that came about and 
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how Mr. Kaufman had agreed to that. 
A At the time I was controlling and managing 
General Display, I brought a suit against Walt Disney for 
using one of our designs and I was sure that I was right, 
so I was insisting that — I needed a portion of that to 
sell my company. In other words, I wanted to keep a 
portion of that asset. It took a long time for Mr. Kaufman 
to agree to it. As a matter of fact, he went to the 
offices of Burbidge and Mitchell, who were handling the 
case, and he discussed it with them and looked at the 
complaint and everything else. And he was accompanied with 
his attorney, Robert Radcliffe, at the time and I 
understand that they got — contacted the Walt Disney 
company before they made up their mind. Finally, they 
decided that they would allow me to keep twenty-five 
percent. 
Q Was that lawsuit resolved? 
A It was resolved. 
Q All right. Do you know what the net proceeds 
were from that lawsuit? 
A I believe the agreement called for a 
confidentiality. But from my involvement with the IRS at 
the time, I know that the IRS levied all the net proceeds 
which were a hundred seventy-three thousand dollars. 
Q And you were involved with the IRS because you 
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were personally liable for a portion of General Display's 
tax liability? 
A That is correct. 
Q So after they had settled the lawsuit and the 
IRS had levied the proceeds, you became aware that the IRS 
had levied a hundred seventy-three thousand dollars? 
A That is correct. 
Q Turn to page four paragraph eleven, please. 
Under that provision, it calls for the prevailing party of 
the lawsuit to pay or to collect attorneys fees from the 
other party. Do you see that? 
A Yes. 
Q Tell me how that provision came about? 
A It was the suggestion of Mr. Kaufman and I 
agreed to it. 
Q So Kaufman had insisted upon the attorneys fees 
provision in the contract? 
A That is correct. 
Q Let me show you what * s been marked as 
plaintiff's exhibit two. Can you identify plaintiff's 
exhibit two? 
A Yes. These are my attorneys fees from year 
1990, '91 and '92. 
Q They relate directly to this lawsuit? 
A They do. 
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Q All right, have you undertaken to calculate and 
prepare a summary of those attorneys fees? 
A I have. 
Q What is that final calculation for the three 
year's attorneys fees? 
A Forty-four thousand two hundred twelve dollars 
and fifty cents. 
THE COURT: Does this relate solely to the 
defense's treatment of this claim or defense of Radcliffe 
claim — 
MR. HOLBROOK: I will put evidence on. In filing 
this lawsuit, if you had filed this lawsuit as a claim 
solely against Mr. Kaufman, prosecuted against Mr. Kaufman, 
would you have to undertake—would your attorneys have to 
undertake the same amount of discovery with respect to 
taking the depositions of Mr. Floor, Mr. Radcliffe, 
yourself, Jay Hansen? 
A It would be almost identical. It would be 
identical. 
Q So, in essence, in defending the Radcliffe 
claim, if you prosecuted claims against all the defendants, 
is roughly the same amount of discovery involved in each 
case? 
A It is. 
Q Let me show you what's been marked as 
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plaintiff's exhibit three. 
THE COURT: Can you identify this document 
plaintiff's exhibit three? 
A Yes. 
MR. HOLBROOK: What is it? 
A It's a summary of the economic damages that I 
suffered. 
Q Let's go over it briefly. I have number one as 
the contract amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars? 
A That's the contract balance of two hundred 
fifty. 
Q All right, and there's also an interest 
paragraph four, ten percent; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Under that you have subparagraph A which relates 
to interest only on the installment payments as they become 
due over eighteen months; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And then the interest from the day of those 
installments to the present; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q On Roman Numeral II, damages relate to your 
covenant not to compete for two years? 
A That is right. 
Q Your salary while you were an officer, ten 
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thousand dollars a month? 
A That is correct. 
Q Your business officer of employment, three 
thousand dollars a month, for a net difference of seven 
thousand dollars a month? 
A That is correct. 
Q And I think three is General Display, Walt 
Disney proceeds hundred seventy-three thousand dollars? 
A Yes. 
Q Your entitlement to twenty-five percent interest 
in that? 
A That is correct. 
Q Item four is the attorneys fees that you have 
expended in this matter? 
A That is correct. 
Q And for a total damages of five hundred 
fifty-three thousand five hundred sixty-three dollars and 
fifty-three cents? 
A Correct. 
Q Item five, which we have not discussed before, 
the costs that you have incurred in this suit uuder Rule 
54, you are entitled to recover certain costs in reviewing 
the financial — The attorney billing statements on exhibit 
two, have you generated and listed those costs which you 
think you are reasonably entitled to under that? 
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A Yes. 
Q Is that a correct description of those costs? 
A Correct.. 
Q We would ask that exhibits two and three be 
admitted into evidence, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: They are admitted. 
MR. HOLBROOK: That's all the testimony I have 
for Mr. Akhavan. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. HOLBROOK: I would like to call Eric 
Patterson to the stand. 
DAVID ERIC PATTERSON 
called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOLBROOK: 
Q Mr. Patterson, could you state your name and 
address for the record, please? 
A My name is David Eric Patterson. I live at 1580 
Northeast Hills Drive in Bountiful Utah. 
Q Could you give us a brief background of your 
work experience in the electronics industry? 
A Sure. I have been working as an electronics 
engineer, consultant and been an electronic technician for 
twelve years now. 
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Q Did there come a time when you did electronic 
work for General Display? 
A I worked first as a consultant. Then I was an 
employee of General Display. 
Q Roughly in the end of 1986 until the beginning 
of 1990? 
A That is correct. 
Q Did there come a time when Joel LaSalle, 
president of General Display, made an announcement that 
Roland Kaufman was going to purchase Sia Akhavan's interest 
in General Display? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you describe the events surrounding that? 
A Mr. LaSalle who's the presiding officer of 
General Display at the time called a meeting for all 
employees, which included myself among many 
others—proceeded to announce Mr. Akhavan was present and 
he proceeded to announce that Mr. Akhavan was selling his 
shares of the company to Mr. Kaufman and that Mr. Kaufman 
was going to institute many other things along with taking 
over Mr. Akhavan's ownership interest in the company. 
Q Did that include fees and capital to help 
General Display's current financial — 
A That was mentioned specifically because it was 
very important to the employees, and there were several 
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questions asked about that. 
Q Was Mr. Kaufman present at this meeting? 
A That is correct. 
Q Did Mr. Kaufman at any time confirm LaSalle's 
statement that he was purchasing Akhavan interest in 
General Display? 
A After several minutes of speaking by Mr. 
LaSalle, Mr. Kaufman took several minutes, indicated that 
he was happy for the opportunity of purchasing Mr. 
Akhavan1s shares, had complimented Akhavan on the job he 
had done bringing the company up to that point, and he was 
looking forward to working with the company in 
proceeding—trying to help the company grow and such. 
Q I have nothing further of this witness. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. HOLBROOK: We would call Michael Beck. 
MICHAEL BECK 
Called as a witness, having been first duly sworn was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HOLBROOK: 
Q Would you please state your name and address for 
the record. 
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A Michael V. Beck 884 North 140 West, American 
Fork. 
Q Could you give a brief description of your 
educational background? 
A Yes. And I have bachelor's degree in accounting 
from Brigham Young and master's degree in taxation from 
Brigham Young. 
Q Could you give us a brief background of your 
work experience in the accounting field? 
A Yes. Right after the University I started with 
Peat Marwick, a big firm here in Salt Lake City. After two 
and a half years with them, I transferred to Arthur 
Anderson and Company, here in Salt Lake City, I spent two 
years with them. I am now a partner in a CPA firm in 
American Fork, have been for the last two years. 
Q All right, in the course of working with those 
three accounting firms, was your primary background with 
respect to taxation accounting? 
A Correct, all areas of taxation. 
Q And in the course of dealing with tax work, were 
you called upon to value companies? 
A Yes. Companies, division of companies and 
equipment and assets of companies for gifting, and the 
estate area, and also for valuing of trusts, and also in 
the area of pension planning for employee stock ownership 
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plans. All companies are required to have valuations, and 
also in general accounting valuation. 
Q In the course of your work, you have done 
valuations, have rendered opinions on the values of 
clients' companies? 
A Correct. 
Q Can you briefly describe methods of valuing 
companies, book value of the company, income value, good 
will? 
A There are basically three areas that make up a 
value of a company. It would be the inherent value of the 
assets. Let's say they have land or something that has 
increased greatly, you would attempt to get a fair market 
of those assets as opposed to the liabilities and come up 
with a value of those assets. Or you would value the 
income streams by placing some sort of capitalization rate 
on the the net income of the company from the past few 
years. There's a value attached to the name and good will 
of the company. 
Q In this case you have been asked to render an 
opinion as to the value of General Display as of the end of 
May of 1992; is that correct? 
A Correct. 




Q During the course of your valuations, do you 
briefly describe the documents that you looked at before 
you rendered an opinion of General Display? 
A Yes. We gathered information—I gathered 
information regarding the sales. All this information is 
for a six months, five month period from January 1 of '92, 
through May 31 of '92. The information we gathered was 
pertaining to the sales, the accounts receivable, the 
accounts payable, the assets, liabilities, cash flow, 
disbursements, all areas of income. 
Q And you had in fact been the primary independent 
accountant of General Display since February of 1989? 
A Correct. 
Q You have prepared their income tax statements? 
A Returns. 
Q Returns, I am sorry, since 1989, in fact the 
returns of '87? 
A They were clients of Arthur Anderson. When I 
left Arthur Anderson I took work with me. 
Q You are aware of the accounting procedures of 
General Display? 
A Yes. 
Q From the history that you have previously 
testified to, have you reached an opinion of the value of 
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General Display as of May 31, 1992? 
A It has no value. The company has approximately 
nine hundred thousand dollars of negative retained 
earnings. 
THE COURT: What are negative retained earnings? 
A That means that the liabilities of a company far 
outweigh any assets. The company has approximately a 
million dollars of current liabilities. 
THE COURT: How many? 
A A million dollars, and hard assets approximately 
three hundred thousand dollars, 
THE COURT: Negative net worth then, is that it? 
A Correct. 
THE COURT: Liabilities exceed assets by that? 
A Correct. 
MR. HOLBROOK: Did you also try to value it 
through the income approach? 
A Yes. Over the last eighteen months, the company 
has had a negative net income; therefore, any type of 
income capitalization isn't appropriate because any 
capitalization that you put on those income flows, once 
again, are in the negative because it's never been in a 
positive cash flow or positive income. 
THE COURT: Is it operating— What kind of 
bankruptcy? 
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MR. HOLBROOK: Chapter 11. 
A A reorganization. 
MR. HOLBROOK: In this chapter 11 phase, is the 
operating income limited? 
A Yes. 
Q Is there any ability to grow as a company? 
A That's a hard one to judge. Any future value of 
the company would have to come from—it would be built from 
ground zero. 
Q Did you find any value with respect to the good 
will of General Display? 
A I made contacts with customers of General 
Display, that have been customers over the last eighteen 
months. I also have written documentation from other 
customers. In all cases, the value of the work that has 
gone on over the last eighteen months or two years is very 
poor. They have complaints about the workmanship, all 
needed to be replaced and the main value of General Display 
out to the public, once again, value is zero. 
Q So in essence, in valuing through the book value 
income approach, you have concluded there's no value. 
That's because you can only go in the negative? 
A You never value in the negative value. 
MR. HOLBROOK: Thank you. That's all I have. 
We would submit it on that basis, and based upon 
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the evidence that's been adduced, we think that we are 
entitled to five hundred fifty-three plus thousand in 
damages and also the costs. 
THE COURT: As hard as I tried, I couldn't find a 
copy of your counterclaim in the file, but I assume that 
your counterclaim states causes of action alleging breach 
of contract and the measure of damages being the contract 
amount which is unpaid. The covenant not to compete, is 
that specifically stated as a cause of action? 
MR. HOLBROOK: I am not — no, I think it is just 
as a general arising from the contract, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I have a little difficulty 
understanding what you are claiming on that quite frankly. 
He would have — he did not compete for the period of two 
years. I take it that he was required not to compete but 
he engaged in the running of this business for a period of 
time, didn't he. 
MR. HOLBROOK: No, he did not — I can put him 
back on. 
THE COURT: That's all right. 
MR. HOLBROOK: He did not take over and go back 
into General Display until January of '92, so it was after 
two years had run and that was basically the business in 
the interim was supposed to be run by Joe LaSalle and 
Kaufman and his agents. 
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THE COURT: You are asking me to give him the 
difference between what he was earning at the time that he 
entered into this agreement and what he actually in fact 
earned during that period of time? 
MR. HOLBROOK: The best money he could have 
earned* 
THE COURT: All right. The court will award him 
damages in the amount as indicated on plaintiff's exhibit 3 
together with attorneys fees and costs. 
THE COURT: Prepare your findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
MR. HOLBROOK: Thank you very much. 
THE COURT: We will recess, 
(whereupon the hearing concluded) 
28 
CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER 
THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, Cathy Gallegos, a Certified Shorthand Reporter 
of Salt Lake County, Utah, do hereby certify that the above 
and foregoing typewritten pages contain a full, true and 
correct transcription of my shorthand notes taken upon the 
occasion set forth in the caption hereof, as reduced to 
typewriting by me or under my direction. 
Witness my hand, this 6th day of December, 1992. 
Cathy Gal/egos, CSRl/RPR 
TabH 
Tiihu.Ju',.!.... ; .• ..:.. .t 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq., #0492 
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq., #5718 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counterclaimant Sia Akhavan 
13 9 East South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
JUL 1 6 1992 
3A 
A LJfpU/-"5^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SIA AKHAVAN, and individual, 
JOEL M. LASALLE, an 
individual, GENERAL DISPLAY 
CORPORATION, and DOES 1 





ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE, 
Counterclaim Defendant, 
REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION and ROLAND 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 900900439CV 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
to the bench, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding, on July 
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7, 1992 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. with respect to the claims and 
counterclaims as between Counterclaimant Sia Akhavan ("Akhavan") 
and Counterclaim Defendant Roland Kaufmann ("Kaufmann"). Akhavan 
appeared in person and through his counsel, Douglas H. Holbrook 
of Burbidge & Mitchell. Kaufmann and his trial counsel did not 
appear to defend against Akhavan's claims. Kaufmann's special 
counsel, Paul Durham of Durham & Evans, appeared only with 
respect to Kaufmannfs Motion for Continuance of Trial, but did 
not appear with respect to Kaufmann1s interests for trial. 
The court having taken evidence in the matter, having 
considered the same, and being advised in the premises, hereby 
makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Kaufmann was properly served with process in this 
action and by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's 
jurisdiction over him. Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been 
represented by competent counsel from the law firm of Metzger, 
Gordon, Scully & Mortimer and Leslieann Haacke, as local counsel. 
2. This case was set for trial in March of 1992, but 
was continued at Kaufmann and his counsel's request. 
3. Kaufmann's counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as 
counsel of record on June 6, 1992, and in said motion represented 
that Kaufmann could not appear at trial, either in person or 
through counsel. 
4. Kaufmann further represented to the court, by 
letter dated July 1, 1992, that he would not appear at trial. 
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The court denied Kaufmannfs counsel's Motion to Withdraw and 
informed Kaufmann and his counsel that if no appearance was made 
at trial, then a default would be entered against them. 
5. Kaufmann and his counsel failed to appear at trial 
in this matter despite adequate notice of the trial. 
6. In September of 1989, Akhavan owned an interest in 
General Display, Inc., a business engaged in manufacturing and 
selling commercial signs. At this time, Akhavan was told by Joel 
LaSalle, president of General Display, that Roland Kaufmann was 
interested in buying Akhavanfs interest in General Display. 
Akhavan attended a meeting in September of 1989 with Robert 
Radcliffe and Mannie Floor, who identified themselves as agents 
for Kaufmann. At this meeting the sale of Akhavanfs shares to 
Kaufmann was discussed. Akhavan and Kaufmann!s agents reached an 
agreement with respect to the price of the shares, but not with 
respect to the terms of payment. 
7. At this meeting Akhavan was told that Kaufmann 
wanted to use General Display to merge with a public shell 
corporation and subsequently make a public offering. 
8. Akhavan was never able to reach agreeable terms 
with Kaufmannfs agents, so Kaufmann came to Salt Lake City from 
Switzerland to negotiate the terms of purchasing Akhavanfs 
shares. Akhavan attended a meeting with Kaufmann in October of 
1989 at Kaufmannfs office on Fort Union Boulevard. 
9. At this meeting, Kaufmann communicated that he was 
very interested in buying Akhavan's stock in General Display. 
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Kaufmann and Akhavan agreed upon the terms of Kaufmann!s purchase 
of Akhavanfs interest in General Display. The agreed upon terms 
were subsequently set forth in Exhibit 1. These terms included, 
but not were not limited to: 
(a) Purchase price of $300,000.00, payable $50r000.00 
immediately with the balance of $250,000.00 to be 
paid over 18 months at an interest rate of 10%; 
(b) Akhavan agreed not to work or compete in the 
commercial signage industry. This covenant not to 
compete was for a period of two years; 
(c) Kaufmann and Akhavan agreed that Akhavan would 
receive 25% of the net proceeds from any judgment 
or settlement of the lawsuit entitled General 
Display Corporation v. The Walt Disney Company; 
and 
(d) If any lawsuit arose from their agreements, the 
prevailing party would be entitled to attorneyfs 
fees. 
10. After entering into the agreement with Akhavan, 
Kaufmann visited the General Display offices and manufacturing 
plant and informed the employees the he was buying Mr. Akhavanfs 
shares in General Display and would be infusing capital into 
General Display to enhance its operation. 
11. Kaufmann made certain representations or omitted 
to provide facts subject to his purchase of Akhavanfs shares 
which he knew were false and/or made with reckless indifference 
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to their truth or falsity. These representations were made with 
the intent to induce Akhavanfs reliance and cause Akhavan to 
enter into the contract for the sale of his interest in General 
Display to Kaufmann. Akhavan reasonably relied on Kaufmannfs 
representations which were material to his decision to enter into 
the agreement for the sale of his interest in General Display to 
Kaufmann. 
12. Akhavan was paid the $50,000.00 by Kaufmann, but 
was never paid any other amounts owed under their contract. 
13. Akhavan contacted Kaufmann with respect to the 
remaining payments under their contract. Kaufmann informed 
Akhavan that he had wired three payments to Akhavan. At this 
time, Kaufmann never stated or told Akhavan to look to someone 
else for payments on their contract, but expressly agreed that he 
would be making the payments. 
14. While employed at General Display, Akhavan was 
earning $10,000.00 per month as salary. His salary was based 
upon his substantial experience in the commercial sign industry. 
Upon entering into the contract with Kaufmann, because of the 
covenant not to compete, Akhavan was not able to obtain a job in 
the commercial sign industry, but was forced to seek jobs as 
production managers of manufacturing plants. The highest salary 
Akhavan would have been able to earn as a production manager 
would have been $3,000.00 a month. 
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15. Akhavan was not paid any money from the net 
proceeds of the General Display v. Walt Disney lawsuit. The net 
proceeds were $173,000.00 of which Akhavan is entitled to 25%. 
16. Akhavan had incurred attorney's fees in 
prosecuting this action against Kaufmann in the amount of 
$44,212.50. Akhavan would have incurred these expenses if this 
suit was filed against Kaufmann alone, irrespective of the claims 
against Radcliffe and Republic International Corporation because 
the discovery which was necessitated in prosecuting claims 
against all parties was identical. 
17. Akhavan is entitled to the difference between the 
contract price, $250,000.00 of which is owed and outstanding, and 
the current value of General Display which is zero. Akhavan is 
entitled to $7,000.00 a month under the covenant not to compete 
for 2 years. Akhavan is entitled to 25% of $173,000.00 and his 
costs and attorney's fees. 
The court having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, 
it now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Kaufmann was properly served with process in this 
action and by Stipulation agreed and submitted to this court's 
jurisdiction over him. Since November of 1990, Kaufmann has been 
represented by competent counsel from the law firm of Metzger, 
Gordon, Scully & Mortimer and Leslieann Haacke, as local counsel. 
2. This case was set for trial in March of 1992, but 
was continued at Kaufmann and his counsel's request. 
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3. Kaufmann!s counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as 
counsel of record on June 6, 1992, and in said motion represented 
that Kaufmann could not appear at trial, either in person or 
through counsel, 
4. Kaufmann further represented to the court, by 
letter dated July 1, 1992, that he would not appear at trial. 
The court denied Kaufmann's counsel's Motion to Withdraw and 
informed Kaufmann and his counsel that if no appearance was made 
at trial, then a default would be entered against them. 
5. Kaufmann and his counsel failed to appear at trial 
in this matter despite adequate notice of the trial. 
6. There was a valid and binding contract entered into 
between Akhavan and Kaufmann under the terms set forth in Exhibit 
1. 
7. Kaufmann, in connection with negotiations for 
executing the contract with Akhavan, made certain representations 
to Akhavan which Kaufmann knew to be false and upon which Akhavan 
relied upon in entering into the contract with Kaufmann. 
Kaufmannfs breaches and misrepresentations have caused Akhavan to 
suffer damages in the amount set forth in Exhibit 3. Akhavan is 
entitled to judgment against Kaufmann in the amount of 
$553,563.53 and costs of $3,006.59. 
DATED this /& day of July, 1992._ 
z 6y the[fcourt: 
/A 
^DGE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
Third"District Judge 
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Fincom Financial Consulting, Ltd. 
Holbeinstrasse 31 







RICHARD D. BURBIDGE, Esq. (#0492) 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL, Esq. (#2278) 
DOUGLAS H. HOLBROOK, Esq. (#5718) 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counterclaimant Sia Akhavan 
139 E. South Temple, Suite 2001 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 355-6677 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH janss^a 
ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SIA AKHAVAN, an individual, 
JOEL M. LaSALLE, an 
individual, GENERAL DISPLAY 
CORPORATION, and DOES 1 





ROBERT D. RADCLIFFE, 
Counterclaim Defendant 
REPUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
CORPORATION and ROLAND 





DEFAULT ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 900900439 CV 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
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The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to 
the bench, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding, on July 7, 
1992 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. with respect to the disposition 
of claims and counterclaims as between Counterclaimant Sia 
Akhavan ("Akhavan") and Counterclaim Defendant Roland Kaufmann 
("Kaufmann"). Akhavan appeared in person and through his 
counsel, Douglas H. Holbrook of Burbidge & Mitchell. Kaufmann 
did not appear in person and Kaufmannfs counsel, Paul Durham of 
Durham & Evans, appeared specially with respect to Kaufmann's 
Motion for Continuance of Trial only, but did not appear with 
respect to Kaufmann's interests for trial. 
Pursuant to the court's prior rulings that if Kaufmann 
and his counsel failed to appear for trial a default judgment 
would be entered, the court, having taken evidence in the matter 
with respect to the issue of damages, attorney's fees and costs 
of suit, having considered the same and being fully advised in 
the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; 
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES the following: 
1. A Default Judgment is hereby granted in favor of 
Counterclaimant Akhavan and against Counterclaim Defendant 
Kaufmann in the amount of $553,563.53 in damages (including 
attorney's fees) and the further amount of $3,006.59 in costs of 
suit, for a total judgment sum of $556,570.12. 
2 
2. Said judgment in the amount of $556,570.12 shall 
bear interest at the judgment rate of 12% per annum from and 
after July 7, 1992 until paid in full. 
DATED this day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURTf" "? 
THE-^ONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
js akbavan\judj5 
\ 052 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a copy 
of the proposed Default Order and Judgment to the following 
parties by depositing the same in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, 
this ' ^ day of July, 1992: 
Jeffrey p. Bloom, Esq. 
Metzger, Gordon, Scully & Mortimer 
1275 K Street, N.W., Suite 1000 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Paul Durham, Esq. 
Durham & Evans 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
3 6 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roland Kaufmann 
Fincom Financial Consulting, Ltd. 
Holbeinstrasse 31 
P-O. Box 622 
CH-8024 Zurich 
Switzerland 
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